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“We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about 
peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a gov-
ernment functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do any-
thing which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.”1 
 
- Jawaharlal Nehru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Motha, Madhup and Sinha, Artish (2009): “Indian Foreign Policy”, Foreign Service Institute, New Delhi, 
p.5. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Historically, India and the United States (US), the two largest democracies in the world, 
have often been viewed as natural allies. However, estrangement rather than engagement 
has dominated India - US ties for a larger part of their relationship, especially during the 
years of the Cold War. Although relations were not out rightly hostile, for decades the 
United States and India have disagreed on many issues, ranging from economic policy to 
nuclear non-proliferation. Close relations between the United States and Pakistan, along 
with India’s diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union have most evidently prevented India 
from strengthening its relations with the United States. With the end of the Cold War many 
academics and policy makers, expected India and the United States would engage in closer 
cooperation now that systemic constraints of the East-West divide had disappeared. How-
ever, while the Western world celebrated the triumph of liberal democracy over authoritar-
ian forms of government, India found itself in a difficult situation. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, India not only lost its largest and most significant trading partner, but also its 
most important supporter and ally with regard to national security. Recognizing the fact 
that the United States remained the sole super power in the international system, many 
experts advocated that India should pay particular attention to building a better relationship 
with Washington. However, problems over nuclear proliferation2 and the close ties be-
tween the United States and Pakistan continued to disturb the relationship. The United 
States urged India to go curb nuclear proliferation but India was not ready to make any 
steps in signing the ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)’3 until there was a commit-
ment on the part of the existing nuclear weapon states for universal nuclear disarmament. 
The two countries remained at loggerheads over the question of nuclear weapons. When 
India tested nuclear weapons in 1998, the relationship appeared to have further deteriorated 
since the years of the Cold War. 
                                                          
2 India is part of a group of three states (India, Pakistan and Israel) that is up to this day not a signatory of the 
‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)’. The United States urged India to sign the treaty but India, arguing 
that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the 
legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, refused to do so.  
3 The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament. The Treaty establishes a safeguards system 
under the responsibility of the IAEA, which also plays a central role under the Treaty in areas of technology 
transfer for peaceful purposes; United Nations (1970): “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT)”, New York. Accessed on: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf    
  
 10 
However, given these events it is more surprising that following the 1998 nuclear tests a 
major shift in India’s US Policy can be marked for the years that followed. Even though 
there was confusion and an apparent loss of direction in India’s foreign policy following 
the nuclear tests in May 1998, India seemed to be clear on one point: the country had to 
move closer to the United States. The message was expressed within a few hours of the 
first explosion on May, 11 1998 that India was ready for understanding, an accommoda-
tion, a compromise, and even for a strategic partnership with the United States. Former 
Prime Minister Aral Bihari Vajpayee went beyond the efforts of any previous Prime Minis-
ter in drawing out a new vision for Indo-US relations. In the 2000 ‘Joint Vision Statement’ 
he referred to the United States and India as ‘natural allies’ and concentrated on tightening 
this alliance in the following years. The change in US policy that was initiated by Prime 
Minister Vajpayee was carried forward by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Immediately 
after the September 11 attacks in New York India was one of the first countries to declare 
unconditional support to the US war on terror. In the following years India and the United 
States increased military-to-military cooperation in a major way. Defence cooperation 
reached its peak when in 2005 the United States officially declared their intention to help 
India become a major global power in the 21st century. The India – US agreement on nu-
clear cooperation announced during Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington in July 2005 
has been termed ‘historic’ by its supporters and detractors alike4. The deal is described to 
be the most important strategic realignment of recent times in Indian foreign policy. Claim-
ing that in the 21st century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a 
common interest and responsibility towards ensuring regional and international security, an 
engagement process started in a period following the nuclear tests in 1998 that culminated 
in the nuclear deal in 2005.  
 
 
1.1 Research Questions 
 
This paper aims to understand the realignment of Indian foreign policy towards the United 
States, a process that started following the nuclear tests in 1998. This paper analyzes the 
motivations and driving factors behind the decision of Indian policy makers to reorient its 
foreign policy in direction United States. Moreover it also attempts to identify the most 
                                                          
4 Squassoni, Sharon (2005): “U. S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, Congressional 
Research Service, Washington. 
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important factors that shaped Indian foreign policy in relation to the United States after 
1998 till today. The main research question can be formulated as follows: 
  
• What are the reasons for the major shift in India’s foreign policy towards the 
United States that started after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998?  
 
In this context, questions of particular relevance to the present research can be grouped as 
follows: 
 
• Are shared democratic values and common regime type (democracy) the main 
drivers in the realignment process? Did improved economic ties between India and 
the United States have a significant influence on the change of India’s U.S. policy?  
 
• Or did national security interests play the main role in India’s realignment with the 
United States? Did changes in the international political system after the Cold War 
and a changed regional and international security environment have a significant 
influence on changes in India’s US policy? Caused the growing concern about a 
Chinese hegemony in Asia fundamental changes in India’s foreign policy towards 
the United States?  
 
 
1.2 Current Research Situation 
 
At the outset this paper will briefly summarize the current academic debate on the trans-
formation of Indian foreign policy towards the United States. Within the current research 
situation, one recognizes that liberal and realist theories largely dominate the current de-
bate. Each theoretical school has ideas and explanations on why India realigned its foreign 
policy towards the United States. While realists argue that the security issue has been the 
overriding goal, liberalists argue that shared common values and regime type are the ex-
plaining variables.  
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1.2.1 Liberal Theories 
 
While analyzing the shift of India’s foreign policy towards the United States this paper 
refers to the liberalist theories of international relations. Liberal theorists state that com-
mon democratic regime type and increased economic interdependence are the main reasons 
for the realignment process in India’s U.S. policy that started in 1998. This paper uses two 
well known frameworks of liberalist theories, Democratic Peace Theory and Economic 
Interdependence Theory to support these assumptions: 
 
 Democratic Peace Theory argues that common democratic regime types are one of 
the main driving forces behind the realignment in India’s U.S. policy. Theorist that 
argue in line with Democratic Peace Theory hold that India and the United States, 
being the two largest democracies in the world, share fundamental democratic 
values, common political culture, a free press and respect the rule of law5. All of 
which has led to the two countries strengthening their relationship significantly in 
the last decade. 
 
 Economic Interdependence Theory argues that enhanced economic cooperation 
between India and the United States intensively contributed to the recent 
improvements in India – US relations. Scholars that argue in line with Economic 
Interdependence theory hold that increased economic cooperation between India 
and the United States had positive effects on the states over all relations.6 
 
 
1.2.2 Realist Theories 
 
Structural realists ignore cultural differences in regime type, mainly because the interna-
tional system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers. They treat states as 
black-boxes. Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively little for how it 
                                                          
5 Kux, Dennis (2002): “India’s Fine Balance”, in: Foreign Affairs, May–June; Kux, Dennis (2007): “India at 
Sixty: A Positive Balance Sheet”, Foreign Policy Association Press, New York; Kumar, Dheeraj (2009): 
“Indo – U.S. Relations: Historical Perspectives”, in Strategic Insight, Volume 8, Issue 3 
6 Ram, A. N. (1999): “Challenges to Economic Diplomacy”, in: Jetly, Nancy and Prasad, Bimal (1999): “In-
dia’s Foreign Policy – Challenges and Prospects”, Harsha Process and Print, New Delhi.; Also Kumar, 
Nagesh (2009): “India and broader economic integration in Asia: An agenda for the East Asia Summit”, in: 
“Indian Foreign Policy”, edited by Motha, Madhup and Sinha, Artish, Foreign Service Institute, New Delhi.  
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acts towards other states. Nor does it matter much who is in charge of conducting a state’s 
foreign policy. Structural realists state that national security concerns are the most impor-
tant aspect in India’s policy of realignment towards the United States.7 They state that the 
growing concern about a Chinese hegemony in Asia was the main driving factor for fun-
damental changes in India’s foreign policy towards the United States.8 Structural realists 
argue that the recent shift can be seen as a strategy to cope with the changed security envi-
ronment and the steadily increasing threat imposed by China. They hold that India fol-
lowed a Balance of Threat strategy to handle its changed regional security environment 
and the threat imposed by China. In line with Balance of Threat Theory India sought to 
increase its own military capabilities (internal balancing) and established a formal alliance 
with the United States (external balancing), seeking to preserve its own national interest by 
checking the power of the opposing side (China).9 
 
This paper gives strongly emphasizes that liberalist and realist theories cannot jointly ex-
plain the status of Indo-US ties. The theories this paper uses cannot simply be combined 
together so as to add up to different views of the same world of international relations; in-
stead they actually see different worlds. It is important to stress those realists and liberalists 
have very different viewpoints on why India realigned its foreign policy towards the 
United States following the nuclear tests in 1998. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of this Thesis 
 
This study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter (‘Introduction’) discusses the aim 
of this study. It introduces the reader to the current research debate on the subject and pre-
sents the methodical approach. In the second chapter (‘Theoretical Approach’) this paper 
will define the term ‘Foreign Policy’ and articulate that it can be approached in many 
ways. It will discuss structural realist and liberalist approaches of foreign policy and give 
reason why they are appropriate while analysing Indian foreign policy towards the United 
                                                          
7 Nayar, Baldev Raj and Paul, T.V. (2004): “India in the World Order – Searching for Major Power Status”, 
Cambridge University Press, New Delhi. 
8 Koshy, Ninan (2006): “Under the Empire: India’s New Foreign Policy”, Left Word Publishing House, New 
Delhi. 
9 Bajpai, Kanti (2000): “India, China and Asian Security”, in: “The Peacock and the Dragon: India-China 
Relations in the 21st Century”, edited by Kanti, Bajpai and Mattoo, Amitabh, Har-Anand Publications, New 
Delhi, p. 26-50; Also Sen, Kaushik (2000): “India, China and the United States”, in: “The Peacock and the 
Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century”, edited by Kanti, Bajpai and Mattoo, Amitabh, Har-
Anand Publications, New Delhi, p. 251-270. 
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States. In the third chapter (‘India’s Foreign Policy towards the United States: A Historical 
Overview’) this paper critically analyze India's US policy since India became independent 
in 1947. This paper argues that understanding the history of India’s foreign policy towards 
the United States is fundamental in understanding the significance of the recent realign-
ment. Comparing India's US policy before and after the recent shift enables us to pinpoint 
the driving forces behind the improvements. The fourth chapter (‘Analysing India’s Re-
alignment towards the United States: A Liberalist Perspective’), analyzes if common de-
mocratic regime type and increased economic interdependence are the main reasons for the 
realignment process in India’s U.S. policy that started in 1998. The fifth chapter (‘Analys-
ing India’s Realignment towards the United States: A Realist Perspective’) deals with 
structural realist explanations of the realignment in India’s U.S. policy. The last chapter 
(‘Conclusion’) sums up the results of this study and gives an outlook on how Indian for-
eign policy toward the United States is likely to develop in the coming years. 
 
 
1.4 Significance 
 
India's recent economic growth and its expanding political significance make it an increas-
ingly important area of research in the academic world. The topic of this paper is valuable 
to the political discourse on India since the future of Indo-US relations is relevant not only 
to the political affairs and security in South Asia but the rest of the international commu-
nity as well. This issue is further significant if one views the realignment of India’s foreign 
policy as a strategy to contain Chinese influence in Asia. How India, the United States and 
China will manage their relationships over the next few years will determine whether the 
foundations for a lasting peace and prosperity in Asia and the rest of the world can be laid 
or not. 
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1.5 Methodical Approach 
 
As part of a research visit in India, the author of this paper attended two semesters at Jawa-
harlal Nehru University (JNU)10 between October 2008 and April 2009. One of the main 
reasons to conduct research in India was the lack of literature on Indian foreign policy in 
Austria and Germany where local and residential libraries could provide very little material 
on the topic. The JNU library provided a vast spectrum of literature on Indian foreign pol-
icy and related subjects along with offering an archive of the External Ministry of Affairs 
with official documents and statements of the last 60 years. As a student of JNU the author 
of this paper had the access to official foreign policy guidelines and papers.  
 
At JNU the author of this paper attended three lectures which were all related to the topic 
of this thesis. The lecture ‘Indian Foreign Policy’ by Mrs. Moushumi Basu presented an 
overview of Indian foreign policy since independence. It introduced liberalist and realist 
perspectives to approach Indian foreign policy. The lecture ‘Sino-India Relations’ by Mr. 
Srikanth Kondapalli gave an overview of major turning points in India – China relations 
since 1947. The lecture emphasized the ongoing border disputes and its implications on the 
overall relations between the two countries. The lecture ‘India – U.S. Relations’ by Profes-
sor Varun Sahni provided an overview of the countries relations since 1947. It paid par-
ticular attention to the shift in India’s foreign policy after 1998. The Jawaharlal Nehru 
University also maintains a strong cooperation with the India Habitat Centre11 and India 
International Centre12. At the India International Centre, I participated in a conference on 
‘Challenges and Opportunities of Indian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century’ between the 
20th and 22th of November 2009. The conference was supervised by former Foreign Sec-
retary Shyam Saran. Furthermore I visited one public lecture on “India: Towards a New 
US Policy” by former External Affairs Minister Yashwant Singh on the 7th of December 
in 2009. During my stay in India I conducted two interviews with experts on Indian foreign 
                                                          
10 Jawaharlal Nehru University, also known as JNU, is located in New Delhi, India. The University is first 
and foremost a research oriented postgraduate University with about 6000 students and mainly occupied with 
social science, languages and law. It was named after Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, and 
was founded in 1969 by his daughter, Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi; 
http://www.jnu.ac.in/main.asp?sendval=Introduction  
11 Since its opening in 1997, Habitat World has firmly established itself as the country's premier cultural and 
entertainment destination. The activities include theatre, movies, dance & music renditions, art exhibitions, 
talks, walks, workshops and children's events. http://www.indiahabitat.org/ 
12 The India International Centre is a well known non-official organization located in New Delhi, India. It 
was founded in 1958, and inaugurated in 1968. The Library of the India International Centre was established 
in 1962 and houses about 40,000 volumes on social sciences, history, biography, literature and the arts. 
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policy. Mr. Manoj Joshi is the publisher of the magazine ‘Mail Today’13 and an accounted 
expert on India – US relations. In an interview conducted on the 8th of May 2009 he gave 
me great insight in questions on India’s US policy and its strategy of containing China in 
particular. Mrs. Moushumi Basu is a well know foreign policy expert and a Professor in 
Jawaharlal Nehru University. In an interview conducted on 22nd of May in 2009 she gave 
me important information on India’s motivation to conduct its nuclear tests in 1998 and 
reorient its foreign policy towards the United States after the events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Mail Today was founded in November 2007, and published by the India Today Group in a joint venture 
with British newspaper Daily Mail, http://epaper.mailtoday.in/epaperhome.aspx?issue=1352010  
 17 
2. Theoretical Background – Liberalism and Structural-
Realism  
 
Looking at Indian foreign policy from a historical perspective, I. K. Gujral argues that it 
could never be described by a particular school of thought. Historically it was characte-
rized by a tension of idealism and realism.14 Throughout more than five decades India fol-
lowed the so called ‘Non-Alignment Policy’ which was shaped by this either- or approach. 
Historically idealism may find itself in opposition to realism, a worldview which argues 
that a nation's national interest is more important than ethical or moral considerations; 
however, India Non-Alignment Policy showed that there needed to be no conflict between 
the two.15 Today Indian foreign policy is characterized by a continuing tension of neo-
realism and liberalism.  
 
Foreign policy and diplomacy have been described as wheels with which the process of 
international relation operates. No state can live in isolation. Even before interdependence 
of states reached the present stage, the states had several types of relations among them-
selves. These included trade relations, cultural relations and, of course, political relations.16 
A simple definition of foreign policy can be given as follows: According to Christopher 
Hill foreign policy is ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent 
actor (usually a state) in international relations”17. The phrase “an independent actor” en-
ables the inclusion of phenomena such as the European Union; external relations are “offi-
cial” to allow the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the governing mechanisms of the 
state or enterprise while also maintaining parsimony with respect to the vast number of 
inter-national transactions now being conducted; policy is the “sum” of these official rela-
tions because otherwise every particular action could be seen as a separate foreign policy. 
Finally, the policy is “foreign” because the world is still more separated into distinctive 
communities than it is a single, homogenizing entity. These communities therefore need 
strategies for coping with foreigners in their various aspects.18 In line with Hill definitions 
of political activities are notoriously difficult and foreign policy is no exception. The main 
                                                          
14 Gujral, I.K. (1999): ‘Indian Foreign Policy Today’, in: “India’s Foreign Policy – Challenges and Pros-
pects”, edited by Jetly, Nancy and Prasad, Bimal, Harsha Process and Print, New Delhi, p.22. 
15 Nayar, Baldev Raj and Paul, T.V. (2004): “India in the World Order – Searching for Major Power Status”, 
Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, p. 17. 
16 Khanna, V. N. (2007): ‘Foreign Policy of India’, Publishing House PVT, New Delhi, p. 1. 
17 Hill, Christopher (2003): ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy’, Palgrave Macmillan, London, p.3. 
18 Ibid. p.3 
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problem of finding a universal definition of foreign policy is that it can be approached in 
many different ways within international relations.19 This paper concentrates on realist and 
liberalist approaches to foreign policy.  
 
 
2.1 Liberalism  
 
 
Liberalism contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by highlighting how state 
preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behaviour. 
Preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic 
system or government type. In contrast to realism where the state is seen as a unitary actor, 
liberalism argues for plurality in state actions. Therefore, Liberalism holds that interaction 
between states is not limited to the political (high politics), but also economic (low poli-
tics) whether through commercial firms, organizations or individuals.20 
 
 
History of Liberalist Approaches in International Relations 
 
Liberalism has its roots in thinkers in the tradition of European reconnaissance, who for-
mulated the possibility of civilizing foreign policy. Among these Immanuel Kant had a 
decisive impact on modern liberalism. In his ‘Treaties on Perpetual Peace’ published in 
1795, Kant refined the liberal argument by suggesting that peace among democratic na-
tions would be the consequence of three complementary influences.21 First, republican 
constitutions eliminate autocratic caprice in waging war. Second, an understanding of the 
legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics develops with the spread of democracy, 
leading to the creation of a moral foundation for the liberal peace upon which eventually a 
structure of international law can be built. Lastly, economic interdependence enhances 
constitutional constraints and liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage 
                                                          
19 Ibid. p.4 
20 Doyle, Michael W. (1996): “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, in “Debating the Democratic 
Peace”, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E: Miller, MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 
50. 
21 Ibid. p. 56 
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accommodation rather than conflict. Consequently material incentives attach their force to 
law and morality.22  
However, the number of democratic states was very limited until the middle of the twenti-
eth century. So was the number of international organizations.23 Moreover, the ideas of 
liberal economic theory according to which trade and economic interdependence contribute 
to peace were put to rest by the First World War which was fought among economically 
interdependent states. Because of the events of the First World War and the failure of the 
League of Nations in the aftermath of war, liberal theories on peace among democratic 
systems or among liberal economies were regarded as utopian. Scholars such as E. H. Carr 
branded and condemned them as ‘idealist’ contrasting them to realism as the proper way to 
theorize about the international political system.24 The end of the Second World War and 
the following wave of democratization could have brought back Kant’s ideas on peace 
among democratic states. However, in the wake of the Cold War, international politics was 
largely conceptualized as responding to the pressures of the anarchic international system 
and the power rivalries between the Communist East and Capitalist West. Realist balance 
of power theories dominated international relations theory once again25. This changed only 
in the 1970’s. The rise of the European Union as a supranational organization of liberal 
states and increasing global economic integration allowed liberalist theories come to the 
fore another time. Kant’s basic argument fitted well to the perceived change of interna-
tional reality in the 1970s: economic interdependence, increased international cooperation 
and international organizations spread; and democratization continued. Since all this three 
developments facilitate peace according to Kant’s hypothesis, democratic peace ap-
proaches became integral parts of various research programmes.26 In 1982 already, Jack 
Levy called the ‘democratic peace’ proposition the only ‘law’ we found so far in interna-
tional relations.  
 
With the end of the Cold War liberal approaches in foreign policy gained more attention 
because realist theories of international relations were not able to explain the sudden de-
cline of the Soviet Union. The most important contribution was made by the political sci-
                                                          
22 Ibid. p. 57. 
23 Russett and O’Neal. (2001): “Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Or-
ganizations”, W. W. Norton, New York. 
24 See E. H. Carr (1939): ‘The Twenty Years Crisis’. 
25 See e. g. Waltz, Kenneth (1979): ‘Theory of International Politics’, Mass: Addison-Wesley, Reading. 
26 Russett and O’Neal. (2001): “Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Or-
ganizations”, W. W. Norton, New York., See also Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (1998): „Friedensstrategien. Eine 
systematische Darstellung außenpolitischer Theorien von Machiavelli bis Madariaga“., Westdeutscher 
Verlag, Opladen. 
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entist Andrew Moravcsik.27 Moravcsik emphasized in his ‘New Liberalism’ on the primary 
role of society actors, the transformation of society preferences into state preferences and 
the interaction between the society level and the international system. Moravcsik concludes 
that his ‘new theory’ is not empirically sufficient to explain all of international relations, 
but it is analytically more fundamental than other types of international relations theory 
(e.g. realism). 
 
 
Contemporary Liberal Theories in International Relations Theory  
 
According to Diana Panke and Thomas Risse there is no such thing as a single theory of 
liberalism in international relations theory.28 Rather, there are many approaches of liberal-
ism, which roughly can be divided into classical liberalism and neo-liberalism. In the ter-
minology of Waltz’s ‘three images’, or ‘levels of analysis’, through which he theorized 
international politics, Panke and Risse argue liberalist approaches can be divided into ‘sec-
ond image-‘and ‘third-image approaches’.29 Classical liberal theories of international rela-
tions tend to be second image approaches. By second image, they mean explanations for 
international outcomes that are located at the level of the state. This is significantly differ-
ent to third-image approaches to liberalism which focus on the impact of regimes and in-
ternational organizations on unit-level behaviour (this strand is known as neo-liberalism). 
According to Andrew Moravcsik contemporary liberal international relations theory is no-
table for its fragmentation among different schools, each with its separate literature, the 
most prominent of which relate to democracy and peace; commercial liberalism/economic 
interdependence; and international institutions and regimes.30 The first of these argues that 
democracies are each other’s natural allies, the second emphasizes on the positive conse-
quences of commerce and interdependence, and the third highlights the increasing role of 
international institutions at the present time. This paper concentrates on classical theories 
of Liberalism, namely democratic peace and economic interdependence theory, because 
they are relevant for explaining the shift in India’s foreign policy towards the United 
States. 
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29 Ibid. p. 90. 
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Common to all Liberal Approaches 
 
Despite the differences all liberalist approaches of international relations rest on the core 
assumption that domestic actors or structures strongly influence the foreign policy identi-
ties and interests of states as well as their actual behaviour in international relations. They 
highlight how individuals and the ideas and ideals they have (such as human rights, liberty, 
and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets), and political institutions (democracy, 
representation) can have direct effects on foreign relations. Liberalists believe in the broth-
erhood of man, cosmopolitanism, the goodness of people and the possibility of abolishing 
war, optimism about the peace enhancing outcomes of increased intergovernmental inter-
national organizations, international free trade, and so forth.31 Liberalist approaches con-
tradict with the assumption of realists regarding the determinative role of system structure 
(unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar) and the consequent assumption of state homogeneity.32 
Liberalists on the other hand pay more attention to domestic structures and individual pref-
erences than do realists, and believe that the international system has less than overriding 
influence and so distinguish themselves from structural realists.33 In line with James L. 
Richardson liberalism rejected the traditional practice of international politics, the balance 
of power, alliances, spheres of influence, conquest, and colonization.34 
 
Relevant for analyzing Indian Foreign policy towards the United States are liberal ap-
proaches of democratic peace and economic interdependence theory. Liberal theorists state 
that common values and economic interdependence are the main reasons for the recent 
shift in India’s US policy. They argue that common democratic regime type is one of the 
main driving forces behind the realignment in India’s US policy. Moreover, liberalists ar-
gue that enhanced economic cooperation between India and the United States intensively 
contributed to the recent improvements in India – US relations. Therefore, democratic 
peace and economic interdependence theory apply best to analyzing the shift in India’s 
foreign policy towards the United States.  
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2.1.1 Democratic Peace Theory 
 
Democratic peace theory states that democracies do not go to war with one another be-
cause they share fundamental common norms and values. The idea that democracies do not 
fight each other can be traced back to the writings of Immanuel Kant over two hundred 
years ago in ‘The Perpetual Peace’. However, it was not until the early 1980s and the writ-
ings of Michael Doyle that the idea received its first contemporary articulation.35 Accord-
ing to Doyle two sets of fundamental factors are important in explaining the democratic 
peace. Firstly, the structural limits of democratic institutions and of democratic politics 
make it difficult or even impossible for war-prone leaders to drag their states into wars. 
Doyle stresses the joint effect of these democratic limits, together with the greater open-
ness and transparency of liberal democracies. If both sides are governed by careful, cost-
sensitive politicians that only make use of force defensively, then conflict is far less likely 
to occur.36 Second, democratic peace theorists highlight the importance of normative in-
struments. Liberal and democratic norms engage shared understandings of suitable behav-
iour, stabilized expectations of the future, and are rooted in both institutions and political 
culture. Rule-governed change is a basic principle; the use of coercive force outside the 
structure of rules is forbidden; and trust and reciprocity, and rule of law are at the heart of 
democratic politics. On this view, then, the democratic peace is produced by the way in 
which democracies externalize their domestic political norms of tolerance and compromise 
into their foreign relations, thus making war with other democratic systems very unlikely.37  
 
Summing up, democratic peace theory is primarily concerned with the question of war and 
peace. This raises the question in which way democratic peace theory can be useful to ex-
plain the shift in India’s foreign policy towards the United States. While on the one hand 
India and the US certainly were not close friends in the past (estranged democracies38), on 
the other hand they were never really close to a serious military confrontation. Bruce Rus-
sett argues that even though the democratic peace theory first and foremost is concerned 
about questions of war and peace, it also contributes to explanations why democracies are 
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36 Ibid, p. 12-14. 
37 Ibid, p. 15. 
38 According to NAME the term ‚estranged democracies’ does not comprises any form of hostility 
 23 
more likely to cooperate and, even form alliances, with each other.39 Scholars like Ernst-
Otto Cziempel and Thomas Risse-Kappen provide similar arguments.40 On this account 
this paper emphasizes on explanations why democracies are more likely to cooperate with 
each other than democracies and non-democratic political systems.  
 
Bruce Russett and Ernst-Otto Czempiel give evidence why democratic states are more 
likely to cooperate with each other.41 According to Russet one argument is that democra-
cies tend to develop similar social identities and share common democratic values such as 
human rights, the commitment to solve conflicts peacefully and the rule of law. He further 
states that social identity creates a similar political culture in democracy, which functions 
as the basic concept of a state’s foreign policy.42 Russett draws the conclusion that all these 
aspects lead to the fact that democracies rather trust each other while distrusting non-
democratic political systems. Consequently, in case of threat democracies are more likely 
to support, and even form alliances, with each other.43 Thomas Risse-Kappen work also 
highlights on cooperation between democracies.44 He states that democratic relations are 
characterized through a high degree of mutual sympathy and appreciation. He argues that 
inter democratic relations have their own unique dynamics. He reasons that similarity in 
character and nature creates trust and facilitates cooperation. While relations between de-
mocracies and non-democratic states seem to be unreliable and unpredictable, relations 
between democracies appear to be comparatively stable and foreseeable. Risse-Kappen 
argues that all that facilitates a pattern of cooperative interaction, which in the longer run 
furthers the development of a common identity of democracies as ‘part of us’ (in-group) 
and as distinct from authoritarian as ‘them’.45 In contrast to realists, liberalist can come to 
appreciate that the existence of other liberal states constitutes no threat and instead consti-
tutes an opportunity for mutually beneficial trade and (when needed) alliance against non 
liberal states. According to Doyle “liberals should be prepared […] to […] formally ally 
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40 Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (1998): „Friedensstrategien. Eine systematische Darstellung außenpolitischer 
Theorien von Machiavelli bis Madariaga“., Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen., See also Risse-Kappen, 
Thomas (1995): “Cooperation among Democracies”, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
41 Ibid., Ibid. 
42 Russett, Bruce (1993): “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace”, in American Political 
Science Review 87(3): 624-38. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995): “Cooperation among Democracies”, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey. 
 
45 Ibid. 504-7. 
 24 
with authentically liberal, democratic states that are subjects to threats or actual instances 
of external attack or internal subversion. Their alliances […] with other democratic states 
are not only crucial to their present security, but the best hopes for long-term peace and the 
realization of ideals.”46 
 
 
2.1.2 Economic Interdependence Theory 
 
Theorists like Montesquieu, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant and practitioners like Wood-
row Wilson asserted that economic relations between states pacify political interaction.47 
Growing evidence in recent years shows to validate these claims. Multiple studies, many 
identified with the democratic peace, link interstate trade with a drop of numbers in milita-
rized disputes or wars.48 
 
The traditional argument, put forward by such writers as Adam Smith, Thomas Paine, 
Norman Angell, and, in recent times, Edward Morse, suggests that economic interdepend-
ence by itself increases the value of peace between nations that rationally calculate their 
interests and thereby reduces the danger of war between them.49 The interdependence ar-
gument theory holds that economic interdependence between two states makes military 
conflict very unlikely. Proponents of the trade-promotes-peace proposition identify several 
interrelated theoretical arguments in support of their hypothesis, but give greatest emphasis 
to the economic opportunity cost argument: because trade generates economic benefits for 
both parties, the anticipation that war will disrupt trade and lead to a loss or reduction of 
the gains from trade helps to deter political leaders from taking actions that are likely to 
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lead to war against key trading partners As long as high levels of interdependence can be 
maintained, liberals assert, we have reason for optimism.50 
 
 
Economic Interdependence Theory  
 
While classical economic interdependence theories limit their focus only on the influence 
of economic ties and conflict management, recent debates also emphasize on the positive 
effects of economic interdependence on the states over all relations. Christopher Gelpi and 
Joseph M. Grieco state that economic interdependence does not only make conflict be-
tween two states unlikely, they furthermore argue that it also fosters cooperative political 
relations in many aspects.51 Economic interdependence reinforces constitutional con-
straints and liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage political accommo-
dation. In line with Gelpi and Grieco, trade brings individuals of different nations into con-
tact with one another and creates common interests.52 It furthermore increases the prosper-
ity and political power of the peaceful productive members of society. Moreover, in line 
with Gelpi and Grieco, increased economic cooperation leads to people-to-people contact 
in the business world.53 These contacts create more understanding between individuals, 
and because individuals are member of states, consequently also between states that are 
strongly economically engaged.54 
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2.1.3 Definitions: Norms, Values and National Interest  
 
Norms and Values 
 
Norms are beliefs shared by a community about who they are, what the world is 
like, and given these two things, what they can and should do in given circum-
stances. They are public beliefs that are institutionalised in community discourse, 
doctrine, policies and practice.55 Values are important and enduring beliefs or ide-
als shared by the members of a culture about what is good or desirable and what is 
not. Values exert major influence on the behaviour of an individual and serve as 
broad guidelines in all situations.56 Values are very often strongly connected with 
belief and belief systems. Types of values include ethical and moral values, doc-
trinal and ideological or religious and political values. 
 
 
Democratic values 
 
According to Russet, democratic Values are the fundamental beliefs and constitu-
tional principles which are shared by a democratic society.57 In line with Russet it 
is difficult to give a unitary definition because democratic values may differ from 
state to state.58 However according to Russet one can identify a certain line of core 
democratic values which are shared by all democracies worldwide.59 These are the 
rule of law, the non-violent resolutions of conflicts, human rights, and the equality 
among citizens and beyond the state. 
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National Interest 
 
In contrast to realist definition of national interest, liberalist definition of national 
interest highlights how state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the pri-
mary determinants of state behaviour. In line with a liberalist understanding of na-
tional interest, values and norms play an important role when identifying the na-
tional interest of a country.60 From a liberalist point of view the national interest is 
often equivalent with the general public interest. According to Czempiel, the na-
tional interest is identified with values or norms because the latter are viewed as the 
prime goals of foreign policy.61  
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2.2 Realism 
 
 
Realism contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by stressing that states are self-
interested, power-seeking rational actors, who seek to maximize their security and chances 
of survival. Any cooperation between states is explained as functional in order to maximize 
each individual state's security.62 This paper concentrates on structural realism and the 
concept of balance of threat theory in particular, to analyze Indian foreign policy towards 
the United States. 
 
Roots of Realism 
 
Realism has been the dominant force guiding international relations theory and influencing 
foreign policy, especially since the end of World War 2. E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgen-
thau had a great influence on the development of realist theory.63 They were among the 
first scholars to use the term ‘realism’ and to elaborate its fundamental assumptions by 
contrast with the allegedly idealistic study of international relations that prevailed during 
the interwar period. They claimed that there was no natural harmony among states and that 
it was foolish and even dangerous to hope that the struggle for power among states could 
be tamed by international law, democratisation, and international commerce. For both 
writers, the failure of idealistic scholars to understand these basic points was part of the 
reason why the League of Nations failed to stop the outbreak of the Second World War.64  
 
 
Differences within Realism 
 
There are significant differences among realists. According to Mearsheimer, the most fun-
damental divide between classical realists and structural realists is reflected in the answer 
to a simple but important question: why do states want power?65 For classical realists like 
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Hans Morgenthau, the answer rests in the logic of human nature, whereby virtually every-
one is born with a will power hardwired into them.66 And because states are led by indi-
viduals who are bent on having their state dominate rivals, nothing can be done to alter that 
drive to be all-powerful. 
 
For structural realists, human nature is not so critical to why states want power. In his book 
‘Theory of International Politics’ Kenneth Waltz argues in favour of a systemic ap-
proach.67 Strategic Realism rejects classical realism's basic concept of ‘human nature’ to 
explain international politics. Alternatively, strategic realist thinkers created a theory that 
privileges structural constraints over agents' strategies and motivations. Another main dif-
ference between classical realism and strategic realism is the explanation of wars. Classical 
realists put an emphasis on the self-centred and static human nature which therefore makes 
states egoistic and power seeking units. Strategic realists, on the other hand, argue that the 
conflict in international relations can be explained by the state of anarchy. Anarchy in in-
ternational relations means the absence of rule or lack of government. Thus, there is no 
hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes or order the system. The 
interaction of egoism and anarchy leads to “the overriding role of power in international 
relations”68 and requires the primacy in all political life of power and security. Strategic 
Realists recognize that the absence of a governing authority (anarchy) causes states to 
worry about their security and the balance of power.69  
 
 
Common to all realist Approaches 
 
Whatever their differences, all realist theories proceed from realism’s three core assump-
tions of groupism, egoism, and power-centrism. According to realist thought, humans in-
teract mainly as members of groups. People need the cohesion provided by group solidar-
ity. Yet that very same in-group cohesion generates the potential for conflict with other 
groups. Today the most important human groups are nation-states and the most important 
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source of in-group cohesion is nationalism.70 Secondly, human nature, according to real-
ists, is at its core egoistic, and thus inalterably inclined towards immorality. Self-interests 
ultimately drive political behaviour. Realists argue that egoism is rooted in human nature. 
When ultimate trade-offs between collective and self-interests must be confronted, egoism 
tends to trump altruism.71 Thirdly, realists believe that power is the most important feature 
of the international political system. Hans Morgenthau stressed the importance of power in 
realist theory by saying that “the struggle for power is universal in time and space”.72 It is 
important not only to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no 
other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour. Summing up, the overriding 
goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at 
the expense of other states.73 According to Griffith it follows that, for realists, international 
relations theory is the analysis of states pursuing power. The achievement of comparative 
peace is the result of the manipulation of power.74 All other issues are subordinate to this. 
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2.2.1 Structural Realism 
 
Why do states want power? 
 
According to Mearsheimer there is simple structural explanation why states want power. It 
is based on five assumptions about the international system.75 None of these assumptions 
alone can explain why states compete for power among each other. But when they are put 
together, they show a world of security competition.76 
 
The first assumption is that the international political system is an anarchic system. Anar-
chy in international relations means the absence of rule or lack of government. Thus, there 
is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes or order the system. 
Anarchy does not mean the international system is characterized by chaos. The second 
assumption is that all states possess some form of offensive military capability. Every state 
has therefore the power to use offensive military capabilities against other states. These 
capabilities vary from state to state and they can change over time.77 The third assumption 
is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States ultimately want 
to know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power, or 
whether they are satisfied with the current situation. The problem is that it is almost im-
possible to discern another states intention with a high degree of certainty. Unlike military 
capabilities, intentions cannot be easily empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of 
decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern. One might argue that decision 
makers reveal their intentions in speeches and policy documents, which can be assessed. 
The problem with that argument is that policy makers sometimes lie about or conceal their 
true intentions. The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival. States seek 
to maintain their territorial integrity and the sovereignty of their domestic political order. 
They can follow other goals like wealth and protecting human rights, but those aims al-
ways take a back seat to survival, because if a state’s survival is in question, it will not able 
to pursue those other goals. The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is 
to say they are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects 
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for survival. Summing up, none of these assumptions on their own implicate that states will 
or should compete with each other for power. It is only by combining all these assumptions 
that circumstances arise where states not only become preoccupied with the balance of 
power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each other’s expense.78 
 
Fearful of other states, and knowing that they operate in a self-help international system, 
states realize that the best way to survive is to acquire power. The rationale here is 
straightforward: the more powerful a state is, relative to its competitors, the less likely it 
will be attacked. This simple logic drives great powers to constantly look for opportunities 
to shift the balance of power in their favor. At the very last, states want to make sure that 
no other state gains power at their expense and because each state in the system under-
stands that logic, all political behavior is in the end a struggle.79 The structural essentials 
portrayed above are reflected in the famous concept of the security dilemma.80 The logic of 
that dilemma is that every step a state takes to increase its own security decreases the secu-
rity of the other states in the international political system. For example, any country that 
tries to improve its position in the balance of power does so at the expense of other coun-
tries, which consequently loose relative power. According to Glaser, international politics 
is therefore a zero-sum game. It is difficult for states to improve their security and at the 
same time not to threaten the security of other states.  
 
 
How much power is enough? 
 
According to Mearsheimer, there is a disagreement among structural realists about how 
much power states should aim to gain.81 Offensive realists argue that states should always 
be looking for opportunities to gain more power and should so whenever the opportunity 
arises, because that is the best way to ensure survival. Defensive realists on the other hand 
argue that states, by their account, should instead strive for what Kenneth Waltz calls an 
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‘appropriate amount of power’. This restraint is the result of three factors: Defensive real-
ists state that if a state becomes too powerful, balancing actions take place. Specifically, 
the other great powers will build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition that will 
leave the aspiring hegemon less secure.82 Defensive realists argue that there is an offence-
defense balance, which indicates how easy or difficult it is to conquer a territory or defeat a 
rival in battle. Simply put, it tells you whether or not offence pays off. Defensive realists 
argue that the offence-defense battle should be usually in the defender’s favor, and there-
fore any states that attempts to gain large amounts of additional power is likely to end up 
fighting a series of losing wars. Consequently, states will recognize the pointlessness of 
offence and concentrate instead on maintaining their position in the balance of power. If 
they do go on the offensive, their aims will be limited.83 
 
Mearsheimer’s theory of ‘Offensive Realism’ holds that the structure of the system forces 
states to act aggressively towards each other.84 According to Mearsheimer, offensive real-
ists expect states to be constantly looking for opportunities to increase their share of power 
in the international system.85 In accordance with Mearsheimer’s theory, the security com-
petition in this world has a tendency to become intense which in turn will increase the 
probability of wars amongst great powers.86 Moreover, the grave peril of conflict will arise 
whenever there is a potential hegemon on the scene. Given the difficulty of determining 
how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best 
way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility 
of a challenge by another great power later.  
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2.2.2 Balance of Threat Theory 
 
 
According to structural realists, international environment is one of the most important 
determinants of foreign policy.87 In any case, foreign policy is the sum total of decisions 
taken by a country to regulate the behaviour of other states. Therefore, the international 
system at any given point of time has direct influence on foreign policies. Khanna sums up 
the situation as following: “The complexity of foreign policy arises from the interaction of 
the desire of states within the international community to achieve their own national inter-
ests, and their consequent attitudes to international issues.”88  
 
The term balance of power describes the relative distribution of power among states into 
equal or unequal shares. Traditionally, it refers to a state of affairs in which no one state 
predominates the other. Prescriptively, it refers to a policy of promoting power equilibrium 
on the assumption that unbalanced power is dangerous. A balance of power policy requires 
that a state moderates its independent quest for power, since too much for one state may 
bring about self-defeating reactions of fear and hostility from other states.89 Balance of 
power theorists posit that, to manage insecurity, states make rational and calculated evalua-
tions of the costs and benefits of particular policies that determine the state’s role in a bal-
ance of power. Should we increase our power by seeking new allies? Is our enemy (or 
friend) altering the balance of power to our detriment? What can we do to make the bal-
ance of power shift in our favour? By both explicitly or implicitly asking and answering 
those questions, states minimize their insecurity by protecting their own interests. All states 
are continually making choices to increase their own capabilities and to undermine the 
capabilities of others, and thereby the balance of power is maintained.90 When that balance 
of power is jeopardized, insecurity leads states to pursue countervailing policies. A balance 
of power operates at both the international and regional levels. At the international level 
during the Cold War, for instance, a relative balance of power was maintained between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. If one of the superpowers augmented its power 
through the expansion of its alliances or through the acquisition of more deadly, more ef-
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fective armaments, the other responded in kind. Absolute gains were not as critical as rela-
tive gains; no matter how much total power one state accrued, neither state could afford to 
fall behind the other. Not to maintaining the power balance was a too risky strategy; na-
tional survival was at stake.91 Realists’ theorists argue that the balance of power is the most 
important technique for managing insecurity. It is compatible with the nature of man and 
of the state, which is to act to protect one’s self-interest by maintaining one’s own power 
position relative to others.92 
 
The ‘Balance of Threat Theory’ is established from the Balance of Power Theory. The 
Balance of Threat Theory predicts that states will balance against threats. States will check 
dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own capabilities (‘internal balanc-
ing’) or aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliances (‘external balancing’). 
Because states are always looking at the future to anticipate possible problems, balancing 
may occur even before any one state or alliance has gained an obvious power edge.93 
Threat, in turn, is driven by a combination of three key variables: aggregate capabilities 
(that is, a state’s overall military and economic potential), geography, and perceptions of 
aggressive attentions. If one state becomes especially powerful and if its location and be-
haviour feed threat perceptions on the part of other states, then balancing strategies will 
come to dominate their foreign policies.94 
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2.2.2 The Concept of National Security 
 
 
National security is a widely debated term. According to Brian C. Schmidt there is no uni-
tary definition of what are the dominant problems of a states security.95 Different schools 
of international relations emphasize on different issues while defining national security. 
This paper concentrates on the realist definition of national security and will avoid other 
definitions. 
 
What is National Security? 
 
According to structural realists the overriding objective of national security is to secure the 
survival of the state. In other words, it is in the national interest of a state to ensure national 
security by orienting foreign policy to the achievement of that goal. According to Schmidt, 
national security is devoted to the four component elements of a state; its physical security 
(population and territory), the idea of the state (nationality and organizing ideologies), its 
institutions (the machinery of government), and finally, its sovereignty. Realists emphasize 
the importance of sovereignty: It provides both security and order to the political commu-
nity living inside the territorial boundaries of the state. 96 
 
According to realists the international political system is dominated by insecurities, dan-
gers, and threats to the very existence of the state. Realists largely explain this on the basis 
that the very condition for order and security – namely, the existence of a sovereign – is 
missing from the international level. Strategic realists conclude that the absence of a go-
verning authority (anarchy) causes states to worry about their security and the balance of 
power. This illustrates the realist argument that national security is a persuasive concern of 
states and explains why survival is ultimately the central goal of all foreign policy. Along 
with anarchy there are two additional factors that generate insecurity among states. The 
first is that most states posses some offensive military capability that can potentially be 
used against a rival state. Second, states are afflicted by a great deal of uncertainty about 
the intentions of other states in the international system. Consequently security can be 
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threatened when states attack other states. States attack their neighbors for a number of 
reasons. They may seek to enhance their power position; they may want to improve access 
to important resources; they may be concerned that a neighboring state is becoming too 
powerful; or they may simply misperceive the intentions of another’s state actions. Regard-
less of the motivation, states are endemically insecure and this leads them to place a pre-
mium on military power.97  
 
 
Threats 
 
There is another complicating factor which must be considered simultaneously with ideas 
of national security: threats. The concept of security only makes sense against the backdrop 
of threats. One of the debates among international relations theorists today is what consti-
tutes the most significant security threat. The traditional realist view is that threats are de-
fined solely in terms of ability of a state to use military force against another state. Accord-
ing to Schmidt, there is not only a debate about what constitutes a threat to national secu-
rity, there is also a debate about the source of such threats.98 Realist theories focus on ex-
ternal sources of national security threats. Threats are seen as emanating outside the 
boundaries of the sovereign state and arising from the anarchical international system. 
Following the ‘Balance of Threat Theory’, threat, in turn, is driven by a combination of 
three key variables: aggregate capabilities (that is, a state’s overall military and economic 
potential), geography, and perceptions of aggressive attentions. If one state becomes espe-
cially powerful and if its location and behavior feed threat perceptions on the part of other 
states, then balancing strategies will come to dominate the foreign policy of the threatened 
state.99 
  
 
How do states achieve security? 
 
Realists view the accumulation of power, especially military power, as the best foreign 
policy route to achieving national security. The state must possess the military wherewi-
thal, either alone or in alliance with other countries, to thwart military threats to its securi-
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ty. For there can be no peace and prosperity without ensuring the physical security of a 
nation.100 This assessment of the character of international relations leads realists to offer a 
number of prescriptive insights. If states want to survive, they have to maintain large stand-
ing armies; they must be vigilant about their defense, never trust the word of other states, 
and always act in the national interest. In essence, realists believe that threats to the securi-
ty of the state are usually posed by other states. In order to achieve its own security (sur-
vival) each state tries to increase its own share of power. Certainly, realists acknowledge 
other forms of power, including wealth and geopolitical advantage. But in the final analy-
sis, the more militarily powerful a state, the more secure it is likely to be.101 
The most common definition holds that if the survival of a state or a number of weak states 
is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should each seek to 
increase their own military capabilities (internal balancing) or join forces by establishing a 
formal alliance (external balancing), seeking to preserve their own independence by check-
ing the power of the opposing side.102 Because states are always looking at the future to 
anticipate possible problems, balancing may occur even before any one state or alliance 
has gained an obvious power edge. 
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2.2.4 Definitions: Power, National Interest and National Securi-
ty 
 
 
Power 
 
This paper does not intend to give a detailed analysis of power. However power is 
central to understanding the realist definition of foreign policy, hence, it will be ap-
propriate to briefly touch upon the meaning and importance of power in the realm 
of realist international relations theory.  
Most scholars focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity, which provides 
the ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one’s own 
objectives. Robert Dahl explained power by stating that A has power over B to the 
extent that it can get B to do something that B would not do otherwise.103 Since 
foreign policy is aimed at regulation of behavior of other states, power alone states 
to formulate and successfully implement their foreign policies.104 In international 
relations power is the ability of a state to enforce respect and command obedience 
from other states. Power is based on the material capabilities a state controls. Real-
ist discourses generally speak in terms of state power, indicating both economic and 
military power. Because realists believe that the international system is anarchic 
and states are always in danger and need power to guard their security, the impor-
tance of power is clear. Power manifests a states position in the international system 
and protects its security. Military strength is a predominant factor in realist under-
standing of power, because its use or threat secures a states existence in the interna-
tional environment.105 Economic power is equally important. Economic power is 
usually the pre-requirement for building armed forces. In that sense, it is also mili-
tary power because it can easily be transformed into such power any time.106 
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National Interest  
 
Political realists assume that every state in any political situation has a national in-
terest which benefits the whole rather than just part of the state. According to realist 
thinkers foreign policy is mainly the enforcement of common national interests 
through the people of a society embodied in the government of the state. All gov-
ernments act in the service of the “national interest”.107 In realist theory the national 
interest is often identified with security because the latter is viewed as the prime 
goal of foreign policy. The realist argument is basically that, unless a state is secure 
it cannot be sure that it will survive and, if it does not survive, it will not be able to 
achieve any other goals favoring its citizen’s welfare. The view that national securi-
ty is the main goal of foreign policy and the most important aspect of national in-
terest is shared by those who believe that the primary purpose of an institution is to 
provide the citizen with protection against external danger. Other realist scholars 
focus more on power rather than security as the central content of national inter-
est.108 
 
 Yet for others this is not a significant distinction. Thus Griffith finds it hard to dis-
tinguish between the two: “At its most primitive level”, he says, “power is the abili-
ty of the state to maintain its own existence. By increasing a sates power it also in-
creases its security at the same time”.109 A further assumption is the belief that it is 
possible to discern where the national interest, whether it is defined in terms of 
power or security, lies. The scholar is expected to be able to see what the statesman 
ought to do or ought to have done in a particular situation.110 This is the implication 
of Morgenthau’s second principle of political realism which reads: “we assume that 
statesman think and act in terms of interest defined as power and the evidence of 
history bears that assumption out. The assumption allows retracing and anticipating, 
as it were, the steps a statesman – past, present or future – has taken or will take on 
                                                          
107 Griffith, M. (2008): “International Relations – The Key Concepts”, 3rd Edition, Routledge Print House, 
Washington, p. 134. 
108 Baumann, Rainer, Rittberger, Volker and Wagner, Wolfgang (1998): “Power and Power Politics: Neo-
realist Foreign Policy Theory and Expectations about German Foreign Policy since Unification”, in Tübin-
ger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung ; 30a, Tübingen, p.19. 
109 Griffith, M. (2008): “International Relations – The Key Concepts”, 3rd Edition, Routledge Print House, 
Washington, p. 135. 
110 Ibid. 
 41 
the political scene”.111 The impact of this assumption is important. By making the 
acquisition of power the unambiguous goal of action, it theoretically makes it poss-
ible to build models of behavior based on ‘rational action’. The relatively constant 
and at present inexplicable relationship between power and the national interest is 
the basic datum for the purposes of both theoretical analysis and political prac-
tice.112 
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3. India's US Policy in a Historical Perspective 
 
 
In order to understand India’s foreign policy towards the United States of America today, 
we have to take a look at India’s US policy in a historical perspective. A country’s foreign 
policy, as every policy, is not static, but subject to constant change according to the needs 
of a changing world situation and the country’s own requirements.113 On the other hand 
however, foreign policy is also based on certain principles, which are rooted in history and 
culture of a country. This applies equally to India’s foreign policy towards the United 
States.114 This chapter will show leading principles in India’s US policy till the end of the 
cold war. Moreover this chapter will highlight how a changing world situation affected 
India’s US policy and established a basis for new facets in India’s US policy after the cold 
war.  
 
While India and the US today have often been called natural allies, it is estrangement 
rather then than engagement that seems to have defined relations between India and the 
United States through much of the last century.115 For most of the four decades of the Cold 
War, the United States was a military ally of Pakistan. For its part, India, after adopting a 
policy of non-alignment to avoid entanglement with either of the two contending global 
power blocs, moved closer to the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, Moscow had be-
come New Delhi’s principal source of sophisticated military equipment. Despite being one 
of the pioneers and founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, India developed a 
closer relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. India's strategic and mili-
tary relations with Moscow and strong socialist policies had an adverse impact on its rela-
tions with the United States. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, India began to review 
its foreign policy in a unipolar world. Subsequently it took steps to develop closer ties with 
the European Union and the United States.  
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3.1 1947-1989: Cold War and Non-Alignment Policy 
 
Almost at the same time the Cold War was gaining momentum, India became free of Brit-
ish imperialism and emerged as a new democratic nation on the political map of the 
world.116 After becoming independent, India and the United States being the two largest 
democracies in the world were expected to develop very close, friendly and cooperative 
relations. The two countries, though quite different from each other in their geographical 
setting, race, culture and habits, cherished common ideals.117 They had both lived under 
subjection to a common power for a long time. Both had fought vigorously for their inde-
pendence, though with different methods. While the American people won their freedom 
through violence and bloodshed, India had preferred the path of non-violence. The democ-
ratic ideals of America also greatly fascinated the Indian leaders, especially Nehru, and 
they tried to develop intimate relations with the United States. Soon after independence, 
India tried to develop very friendly relations with the United States. The Indian leaders 
acknowledged with gratitude the positive role played by the American President exerting 
pressure on the British government to expedite the grant of independence to India.118 Prime 
Minister Nehru in an address to the American audience remarked: "May I also say that all 
of us in India know very well, although it might not be so known in public, what great in-
terest President Roosevelt had in our country's freedom and how he exercised his great 
influence to that end."119 As a result the United States expected India to ally itself with 
America and support US policies in South Asia and the rest of the world. But instead of 
following Cold War power politics and joining one of the two major blocs, India decided 
to follow an independent foreign policy without aligning itself with any of the two power 
blocs. It refused to join any military-like alliance with the US. India had just obtained in-
dependence and according to Mazumdar the last thing on its mind was to be dependant on 
a foreign country again.120 This newly independent foreign policy became known as the 
policy of  ‘Non-Alignment’. 
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3.1.1 Excursus: Non-Alignment  
 
The political international system during the cold war was dominated by the two major 
power blocs. It was described by the continuing political conflict and military tension be-
tween the Soviet Union and its satellite states and on the other hand the powers of the 
Western world, led by the United States. In this context, India’s Non-Alignment policy 
meant not entering into military alliances with any country, or in particular with any coun-
try either of the Western or the Soviet Bloc. The term ‘Non-Alignment’ itself was first 
mentioned by Indian Prime Minister Nehru during a speech in Sri Lanka in 1954. In this 
speech, Nehru described the five pillars to be used as a guide for Sino-Indian relations, 
which were first put forth by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. They were called Panchsheel 
(five restraints). These principles would later serve as the basis of the ‘Non-Alignment 
Policy’.121 The five principles were: 
 
    - Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 
    - Mutual non-aggression 
    - Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs 
    - Equality and mutual benefit 
    - Peaceful co-existence 
 
During the course of his lecture at Columbia University on October 17, 1949 Nehru main-
tained that one of the major objectives of Indian foreign policy was “the pursuit of peace, 
not through alignment with any major power or group of powers, but through an indepen-
dent approach to each controversial or disputed issue”.122 This made India follow the poli-
cy of non-alignment or keeping itself aloof from the bloc politics, while supporting or op-
posing either of the blocs on the merit of issue by issue basis. Though the Indian leaders 
like Nehru refuted time and again that non-alignment is not for developing another bloc in 
international politics, their efforts resulted in the development and projection of non-
aligned countries as a group in international politics. His misgivings on bloc politics influ-
enced Nehru to turn down the offer of the US to join the military alliances like South East 
Asia Treaty Organization123 (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization124 (CENTO), so as 
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to stay away from military alliances and obligations. He opposed the American military aid 
to Pakistan as a part of the ‘alliance system’ on the plea that “a new factor making for ten-
sion and instability should have been introduced by this arms aid”.125 While reacting to the 
SEATO Council’s reference to Kashmir, Nehru maintained that such an action confirmed 
India’s apprehensions about the organization itself. 
 
The basic principles of non-alignment were preservation of India's freedom of action inter-
nationally through refusal to align India with any bloc or alliance. Dr. B. Krishnamurthy 
argues that the decision not to join any of the two blocs was first and foremost based on 
rationality rather then morality.126 In his view Nehru took such a stand since he sincerely 
believed that the ‘bloc politics’ would create a situation in which emerging regional pow-
ers such as India would find it highly difficult to maintain independence in their foreign 
policy and would face severe restrictions on their long-aspired and newly-won sovereignty. 
Being non-aligned on the other hand meant having the freedom to decide each issue on its 
merit, to weigh what was right or wrong, and then take a stand in favor of what was right. 
„We are non-aligned only in relation to the Cold War with its military pacts. We object to 
all the business of forcing the new nations of Asia and Africa into their cold war machine 
[…] Otherwise we are free to condemn any development, which we consider wrongful or 
harmful to the world or ourselves and we use the freedom every time the occasion aris-
es.“127 Nehru emphasized the fact that non-alignment did not mean neutrality. He argued 
that neutrality as a policy was only relevant in times of war. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 
22 November, 1960 he said: „As I have said repeatedly I do not like the word ‚neutral’ on 
being applied to India. I do not even like India’s policy being referred to as ‚positive neu-
trality’ as is done in some countries. Without doubt we are non-aligned, we are uncommit-
ted to military blocs, but the important fact is that we are committed to various policies, 
various urges, various objectives, and various principles – very much so.“128   
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In accordance with its newly won self-confidence and in line with the non-alignment pol-
icy, India started to criticise US policies. These developments raised high concerns in the 
US and made a stronger relationship impossible. India did not approve on the American 
policy of containment of communism against the Soviet Union and China by building up a 
system of military alliances. In line with its newly won freedom and non-alignment policy, 
India recognized the communist regime of China. Following its foreign policy principles of 
pacific settlement of international disputes, India criticized US intervention in Lebanon and 
Jordan. With India’s support of Soviet domination over Hungary, Indo-US relations 
reached a low point. In 1956 Soviet armed forces were sent to Hungary to crush the Hun-
garian people uprising against Soviet domination over their country. When a resolution 
was moved by the United States in the UN General Assembly condemning Soviet interven-
tion, India abstained during voting. This was an indirect way of supporting the Soviet Un-
ion in its actions towards Hungary. Moreover India also voted along with Soviet Union to 
oppose the 5-nation resolution calling for free and democratic elections in Hungary. This 
pro-Soviet policy of India naturally strained already tensed India-US relations.129  
 
To contain communist influence worldwide, the United States established several military 
alliances in 1950s. Following this policy, the United States ensured Pakistan’s entry into 
the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). India had previously rejected to join 
the organization because Prime Minister Nehru was of the opinion that formation of re-
gional military organisations was not in the conformity with the objectives of India’s ‘Non-
Alignment Policy’. Furthermore, the United States and Pakistan signed two bilateral de-
fence agreements in 1954 and 1959.130 Pakistan received large scale military supplies from 
the US. India protested, and argued that the United States harmed India’s national security 
by providing a troubled neighbour with modern sophisticated weapons. India feared that 
US military support for Pakistan would intensify the tensions between India and Pakistan 
and threaten security in South Asia.131 
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3.1.2 India-China Border War in 1962 
 
In 1961 John F. Kennedy took over as US President and Prime Minister Nehru paid his 
third visit to the US that year. The Kennedy government was generally approving of In-
dia’s foreign policy and for the first time recognized India’s principle of peaceful coexis-
tence and accepted the fact that a country could remain neutral in the continuing conflict 
between democracy and communism.132 As a consequence Indo-US relations began to 
improve. Shortly after Nehru’s visit to the US the India-China border War broke out133 and 
put the newly improved relationship to a test. It appeared that India was totally unaware of 
the threat to its territorial integrity imposed by China. Possibilities of war or external ag-
gression were completely ruled out. When India appealed for help to the United States and 
the Soviet Union, the US gave unconditional support to India and sent necessary war mate-
rial. The Soviet Union on the other hand was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and did not offer the support it had provided in the previous years. The Kennedy admini-
stration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression 
against India".134 In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, contingency planning 
on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was dis-
cussed. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the 
President to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Ken-
nedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should de-
fend India, and therefore we will defend India".135 In view of American support the Chi-
nese shortly declared a unilateral cease-fire and started to withdraw military troops from 
Indian Territory. According to Vats Bhagat US support must be seen in accordance with 
her policy of containment of Communist China and to a lesser extent as a shift towards 
India.136 In view of US support given to India, a demand was strongly made in the country 
for modification in India’s policy of non-alignment as well as India’s US policy. Some 
people went to the extent of suggesting that India might enter into an alliance with the 
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United States.137 However, with the withdrawal of military forces by China from most of 
Indian Territory and generally pro-Indian stand of the Soviet Union, India returned to the 
earlier non-alignment position. The rejection of the Indian request for supply of a variety 
of advanced military hardware also checked more intimidate relations between India and 
the US. The Soviet factor and valuable Soviet assistance inhibited relations with Washing-
ton.138 
 
 
3.1.3 India-Pakistan War in 1965 
 
After Nehru’s death in 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri became Prime Minister and fresh ten-
sions erupted in Indo – US relations. During the brief 18 months that Shastri was in power, 
relations between India and the US received a clear setback. The main reason was that the 
US had started a war in Vietnam. India heavily criticised US intervention in Vietnam, 
which led to a strong anti-India opinion in the US. As a consequence the US postponed 
Prime Minister Shastri’s visit to the United States in May 1965 for an indefinite period of 
time. This postponement was very humiliating for India. After President Kennedy’s and 
Prime Minister Nehru’s efforts, India – US relations received a clear drawback. Moreover 
the India – Pakistan war even worsened the relationship.139 The long-standing border dis-
putes, communal tensions, and conflict over the question of Kashmir flared up in a full-
scale war between India and Pakistan in September 1965. The war began following Paki-
stan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir 
to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. The five-week war caused thousands of 
casualties on both sides. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the 
subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.140 The use of American arms by Pakistan 
during the war worsened India-US relations. India protested to the American government 
that its arms were being used against India despite assurances of the US government that 
they would not be used against them. Though Pakistan was the aggressor in the war the US 
Government never really condemned it.141 The US, which had previously supplied military 
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equipment to India and to a bigger extent to Pakistan, imposed an embargo against further 
supplies to both countries once the war had started. The consequence was that the embargo 
especially affected Pakistan since the majority of its equipment was provided by Amer-
ica.142 However, the US maintained neutrality in the war. India criticized the United States 
for maintaining this position because it was clear that Pakistan was the aggressor in this 
war and should therefore be punished. Only when the war seemed to escalate and China 
raised plans of supporting Pakistan militarily, the United States had to take a pro India 
stand. The US warned China against intervention in the war, or otherwise the US would 
provide military aid to India. On September 22, the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both na-
tions. The war ended the following day. The Tashkent Agreement was signed in January 
1966 by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan President Ayub Khan to normal-
ise Indo-Pakistan relations. Within a few hours of the signing of this agreement Shastri 
died at Tashkent. He was succeeded by Mrs. Indira Gandhi.143 
 
 
When Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister in 1966, she felt that she should make an at-
tempt to improve the relations with the U.S. and the West dramatically. Consequently, her 
first visit to a foreign country as a Prime Minister was to the US in March 1966. According 
to Khanna Mrs Gandhi’s visit in 1966 was perhaps the most serious, most extensive and 
most determined bid to establish and promote a close state of Indo-US relations.144 Khanna 
argues that the new international situation, the US-Soviet détente, the Sino-Soviet split, the 
conflict with China and common opposition to Chinese policies would justify the relation-
ships and ensure a long spell of friendly relations between India and the US. Economic and 
political cooperation was put in the context of shared values of democracy and human 
freedom.145 But it did not take much time for her to realize that the US was not interested 
in such improvement in relations with India. Differences remained wide. America’s consis-
tent support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and India critics of the US war in Vietnam 
cooled down the relationship. In 1970 the United States even officially announced that it 
would provide Pakistan with B-57 bomber aircraft and other high technology military 
equipment. Moreover, at that time China and India’s ally the Soviet Union were competing 
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with each other for providing armaments to Pakistan. It was in this situation that East Paki-
stan became an area of serious domestic problems. 
 
The crisis in East Pakistan146 had started as a domestic problem of Pakistan. The war broke 
out on 26 March, 1971 as army units directed by West Pakistan launched a military opera-
tion in East Pakistan against Bengali civilians, students, intelligentsia, and armed personnel 
who were demanding separation from West Pakistan. Members of the East Bengal Regi-
ment, East Pakistan Rifles, East Pakistan police and other Bengali military and paramili-
tary forces revolted to form guerrilla groups and forces to fight against the army of West 
Pakistan. When India started to provide the rebels in East Pakistan with economic, military 
and diplomatic support, it soon developed into a major uprising and resulted in the India-
Pakistan war of December 1971.147 During the crisis and the war, the United States sup-
ported Pakistan both politically and militarily. At first it seemed that US President Richard 
Nixon refused to get involved in the situation, saying that it was a domestic affair of Paki-
stan. But when Pakistan's defeat seemed definite, Nixon sent the USS Enterprise to the Bay 
of Bengal, a move considered by the Indians as a nuclear threat. The Enterprise arrived on 
station on 11 December, 1971. Moreover, the Nixon Administration cut off economic aid 
to India. This pro-Pakistan policy included support of Pakistan in the United Nations and 
pressure on the Soviets to discourage India, with accompanying hints that US-Soviet dé-
tente would be in jeopardy if Moscow did not comply.148 According to Nayar a violent 
confrontation between the U.S. and India was avoided only because India, having accom-
plished its war aims, brought the conflict to a quick end.149  
 
The consequences of the Bangladesh crisis were a big divide between India and the United 
States. The US took a clear pro Pakistan stand and without the support of the Soviet Union 
India would have been forced to give in. The result was that India chose to develop closer 
ties with the Soviet Union. Gradually strengthened ties with the Soviet Union led to the 
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‘Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty150’ in 1971. Although the treaty was stated to be a political 
one, with emphasis on promotion of “consolidation of universal peace and security” 151, it 
sounded more as a military alliance to counter China and Pakistan in particular and the US 
in general. This can be gauged from the fact that the parties undertake to abstain from pro-
viding any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. 
In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the parties shall 
immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threats and to take 
appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.152 
On 18 May, 1974 India tested its first nuclear device at Pokhran. This alarmed the United 
States. India now stood in the line of those five powerful nuclear countries. India made 
clear that its nuclear programme was entirely for peaceful purposes. However, the United 
States was highly critical and felt that the explosion might lead to nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia. Pakistan had naturally raised serious doubts about India’s actual intentions.153 
 
 
3.1.4 State of Emergency in 1977 – Janata Government 
 
Economic problems, corruption and the conviction of Indira Gandhi by the Allahabad High 
Court in 1975 for misusing government machinery for her election campaign led to wide-
spread protests against the Congress government. In response to growing unrest, the gov-
ernment imposed a state of emergency with the rationale of preserving national security. 
The Indian Emergency of 25 June, 1975 – 21 March, 1977 was a 21-month period, when 
President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, upon advice by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, declared a 
state of emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution of India, effectively bestowing on 
her the power to rule by decree, suspending elections and civil liberties. The US highly 
criticized the declaration of emergency. They criticized the abuse and torture of detainees 
and political prisoners and detention of people by police without charge or notification of 
families. The government introduced press censorship, postponed elections and banned 
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strikes and rallies. Opposition leaders were imprisoned along with thousands of other po-
litical activists. All of that led to serious tensions in the India – US relationship.154 
 
 When the state of emergency was lifted and new elections were called in 1977, opposition 
political parties such as the Congress, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal as well as 
defectors from the Congress joined to form the Janata Party, which won a sweeping major-
ity in the Indian Parliament.155 The new government started not only fundamental reforms 
in domestic affairs but also in foreign policy issues. As a consequence relations between 
India and the United States showed an improvement after the formation of Janta Govern-
ment in India in 1977 and the assumption of power by Jimmy Carter in the United States. 
In 1978, Carter paid a visit to India which was followed by return visit by the Indian Prime 
Minister, Morarji Desai. But before much progress could be made, Mrs. Gandhi staged a 
come-back to power in India.156 
 
 
3.1.5 Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan 1979  
 
In December 1979 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan to preserve an unstable Communist 
government against the Islamist Mujahideen Resistance. The Afghan government was also 
supported by India, while the Mujahideen found other support from a variety of sources 
including the United States and Pakistan. The Congress Government refused to rally on the 
side of the United States in its anti-Soviet crusade over Afghanistan and advocated the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan at the appropriate time. In the context of 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan Pakistan was given the status of a frontline state by the US. 
It became America’s outpost in the region and it received significant military aid which led 
to serious tensions in India – US relations.  
 
Only when President Carter was convinced that Pakistan was developing a nuclear bomb, 
in April 1979, America suspended economic and military assistance being given to Paki-
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stan. But consequent upon soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the 
suspended assistance to Pakistan was resumed.157 It was announced that during the next 
five years, Pakistan would be given military assistance to the tune of 1 billion and 600 mil-
lion US dollars. Moreover, the US also sold more than sixteen F-40 fighters’ aircrafts to 
Pakistan. India strongly protested against these decisions. The US ignored the protests and 
justified its decision in order to defend Pakistan against the threat of communism and dan-
gers from the Soviet Union. Pakistan received even greater assistance after Reagan became 
President in 1981. This was done on the ground of prevention of proliferation of commu-
nism in Asia. During the period of 1987 to 1993, the assistance to Pakistan reached an all 
time hight of over 4 billion US dollars. It appeared that the US policy of non-proliferation 
did not apply to Pakistan. It was clearly stated in 1984 that Pakistan's nuclear scientist Dr. 
Abdul Kadir Khan had indeed developed a bomb.158 It was also hinted by Benazir Bhutto 
in 1991 and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan in 1992 that Pakistan possessed 
the capability of manufacturing a nuclear bomb. Ignoring India's repeated pleas, the US 
kept on supplying arms to Pakistan. Moreover the US let it be pointedly known that it had 
imposed no conditions on Pakistan about usage of its arms against India, even as it main-
tained that the large supply was essential for removing any incentive for Pakistan to go in 
for nuclear weapons.159 Ironically, it was precisely at that time it rapidly pushed forward its 
nuclear weapons program. 
 
Indira Gandhi and President Reagan had a meeting after the Cancun meeting of the devel-
oped and developing countries in October 1981. After the summit, the US President ac-
quired a new insight into the Indian thinking and began re-examining the postulates on 
which India’s foreign policy was based. Two assumptions of US foreign policy makers 
were: At first, the US assumed that closer Indo – Soviet relations meant hostility towards 
the west. Secondly, the US was convinced that good relations of India with one Super 
Power could not be possible without bad relationships with the other superpower. After-
wards India tried to convince the US that these assumptions were not valid and the rela-
tions showed signs of improvement. One concrete result of Mrs. Gandhi’s visit was the 
conclusion of an agreement between India and the United States on the long drawn out 
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problem of the supply of enriched uranium to the Tarapur Nuclear Plant..160 As a conse-
quence relations between India and the U.S. improved after Gandhi and President Reagan 
met in 1982. As a result, a commission was set up for mutual exchange on education and 
culture.161 However, differences still persisted mainly in regard to three crucial areas. The 
US continued to assist Pakistan militarily which was strongly resisted by India. Moreover 
the US warned Pakistan of the possibility of an Indian strike against Pakistani nuclear in-
stallations and, thirdly, India suspected the militancy in Punjab to have strong organisa-
tional and financial links in the UK, USA and Canada.162 
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3.2 India's US Policy in a Historical Perspective: Post Cold War 
Period 1990 - 1998 
 
The end of the cold war changed the whole international political environment dramati-
cally. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, India not only lost its largest and most signifi-
cant trading partner, but also its most important supporter and ally with regard to foreign 
policy. For India, it became necessary to revise its foreign policy and to think about the 
role it wanted to play in a post-Cold War international system. According to Prasad “it is 
therefore, necessary to review the world situation and the country’s requirements from 
time to time in order to see whether foreign policy formulations are adequately serving a 
country’s national interest or require changes here and there.”163 The end of the Cold War 
confronted India with a new strategic situation of the semi-unipolar system, in which the 
Soviet Union was no longer available as a political, economic and security anchor, and in 
which non-alignment had lost most of its significance since a leverage-providing rival bloc 
had disappeared. As a consequence India stood out, as Huntington was to describe it, as a 
“lonely” and “friendless power”.164 Facing this situation India had to work out new politi-
cal equitation’s with the major powers and had to redefine its policy towards the United 
States. 
 
There were no longer two blocs. Many felt that India’s foreign policy should change.165 It 
was true there was need for reassessment of bilateral relations not because of any change in 
India’s stance but because of changes in other countries as a result of the new world situa-
tion. Prime Minister Rao himself acknowledged that changes in international situation had 
come with bewildering rapidity and the government stood ready to reorient foreign pol-
icy.166 The Prime Minister was eager for a closer relationship with the US in the changed 
structure of world power. Recognizing the fact that the United States was now the sole 
super power in the international system, he paid particular attention to building a new rela-
tionship with Washington.167 As a consequence there was improvement in military coop-
eration by way of conducting a minor joint naval exercise in 1992. Moreover, the Finance 
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Minister Manmohan Singh initiated the liberalization of Indian economy in 1992, which 
attracted towards India the major world economic powers including the most powerful one, 
the United States of America. The US recognized India as a potentially attractive economic 
partner now that it had opted for liberalization and was enacting economic-policy reforms 
to open its economy to foreign trade and investment. But India’s eagerness to seek en-
gagement with the US thus ran smack into the American policy of containment during the 
first Clinton administration. Engagement therefore proved to be fruitless: “Indo-US politi-
cal relations were on the doldrums “even as economic relations continued to expand.”168 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the fundamental reality was that the interests of the US as 
the sole superpower and of India as an aspirant major power stood in contradiction to each 
other. India’s strategy of engagement was based on the exaggerated expectation that “the 
US would be willing to accept India’s political, technological and economic aspirations 
without any reservations in the transformed international scenario.”169 However the com-
mon attribute of democracy was a poor reed on which to build a strong relationship. Dixit 
states that two main constraints still prevented a closer relationship.170 This was on the one 
hand the nuclear proliferation policy of the US and on the other hand the remaining close 
ties between the United States and Pakistan. India’s decision not to suspend, or terminate, 
its nuclear programme was a major irritant in the India-American relations. India’s policy 
was that it would stop its nuclear programme only if all the nuclear weapon states made a 
commitment that they would bring about complete nuclear disbarment. This commitment 
should have been time-bound so that the world knew by what time it would be free of nu-
clear weapons. But the US was not taking India seriously. It was arguing that India should 
remain without nuclear weapons to ensure its security and not start a nuclear arms race in 
the South Asian region.171  
 
Summing up, India-US relations were still restrained even though the end of the Cold War 
improved conditions for a closer cooperation. It was at this time when India decided to go 
nuclear. On the afternoon of 11 May 1998, Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee informed the 
world that India had conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. It 
was explicit that unlike the 1974 test, these tests were for nuclear weapons and India had 
launched a new nuclear policy. India had become officially a nuclear weapon state. The 
event radically changed the foreign and defence policies of the country and put in place a 
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new national security doctrine.172 The official statement, which followed the Prime Minis-
ter’s announcement, said India remained committed to a speedy process of nuclear disbar-
ment leading to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons. The statement added that 
India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but “this cannot be done in vacuum.”173 These 
tests provide reassurance to the people of the country that their national security interests 
are paramount and will be promoted and protected.”174 Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary 
of the Prime Minister who read the statement, clarified that the tests were not directed 
against the United States, but against China and Pakistan. In a letter written to President 
Clinton within hours of the nuclear explosions on May 11, Vajpayee said: 
 
“I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment especially 
the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an over nu-
clear weapon state on our borders state which committed armed aggression against 
India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last 
decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border 
problem. To add to that distress that country has materially helped another 
neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapon state. At the hands of this bit-
ter neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. For the last 
ten years we have been victims of terrorism encouraged and helped by that country 
in many parts of our country especially in Punjab and Kashmir.” 175 
 
However, the US was outraged by India’s nuclear tests. The United States issued a strong 
statement condemning India and promised that sanctions would follow. The US feared a 
nuclear arms race in South Asia. And indeed, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
vowed that his country would give a suitable reply to the Indians. The Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC) carried out five underground nuclear tests at the Chagai test 
site on the afternoon of May 28, 1998 just fifteen days after India's last test.176 Moreover 
the American establishment was embarrassed as there had been a serious intelligence fail-
ure in detecting the preparations for the test.  
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3.3 Realignment of Indian Foreign Policy towards the United 
States: 1998 - Today 
 
 
In spite of the harsh reaction by the United States, Prime Minister Vajpayee continued his 
efforts on improving the relationship with the United States in the subsequent month. He 
emphasized one more time that the tests were not directed against the United States but 
against Pakistan and China. Building a new relationship with the United States was one of 
the major foreign policy goals of the Prime Minister. In the following, Vajpayee went fur-
ther than any previous Prime Minister in drawing out a new vision for Indo-U.S. relations. 
Addressing the Asia Society in New York on September 28, Vajpayee pointed to the grow-
ing convergence of Indian and American political interests and declared that it “reinforces 
my belief that India and the United States are natural allies in the quest for a better future 
for the world in the 21st Century.”177 Two important features stood out in Vajpayee’s Asia 
Society address. One was the rare public optimism expressed by an Indian leader about the 
future of India-US relations. And secondly, this positive attitude towards the US was being 
expressed less then six months after India’s nuclear tests to which the Clinton Administra-
tion reacted so harshly. Even more significant was the reference in his speech using the 
word ‘alliance’ with the United States that seemed to reflect a fundamental change in the 
Indian foreign policy that had long sworn by ‘Non-Alignment’. In fact the principle of 
‘Non-Alignment’ had always been so dominant in India’s world view that New Delhi had 
never talked about alliances with any great power.178  
 
According to Koshy a closer relationship between India and the US was an ‘advent of the 
inevitable’. The United States provided the single most important, dynamic and strategical-
ly rich option to India.”179 The ‘Vision statement’ signed by President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Vajpayee indicated a shift in India’s foreign policy. Claiming that in the new cen-
tury, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a common interest in and 
complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security, the state-
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ment says: “We will strengthen the international security system, including in the United 
Nations and support the United Nations in its peace-keeping efforts”.180  
 
However there were also critical voices. Dixit argues that old problems still remained 
alive.181 The nuclear question and relations with Pakistan appeared to disturb India-US 
relations as much as in the late 1970s. However, Vajpayee was keen on starting to address 
and solve these problems. On the nuclear front, Vajpayee had irrevocably altered the char-
acter of India’s long-standing policy. By ending India’s decades old ambivalence about 
nuclear weapons and by openly declaring India as a nuclear weapon state, Vajpayee had 
changed the terms of engagement between India and the US-led global nuclear order that 
had become increasingly contentious since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
came into being in 1968. On Pakistan, the short tenure of Vajpayee had seen the explora-
tion of the full spectrum of options guiding New Delhi’s approach. Following the nuclear 
tests of May 1998, Vajpayee reached out to Pakistan to initiate a peace process at Lahore 
in February 1999.   
 
 
3.3.1 09/11 and the War on Terror 
 
The change in US policy that had been initiated by Prime Minister Vajpayee was carried 
forward by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. India’s cooperation with the United States 
accelerated with George W. Bush’s inauguration as the President of the United States in 
January 2001. India was one of the first countries to declare unequivocal support to the US 
War on Terror. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, India’s Foreign Minister Jas-
want Singh offered unsolicited, unlimited military cooperation including the use of air-
bases. Home Minister Advani reiterated the government’s offer of bases and logistical 
support to the US. For India it became a defining moment as the Vajpayee administration 
utilized the opportunity of the War on Terror to shift its foreign policy even more towards 
the US. According to Koshy India’s offer of unconditional military support was an open 
declaration that India had radically changed its US policy.182 To Koshy the declaration was 
not a surprise. The closer India-US cooperation was the result of incremental changes and 
that from the early nineties, beginning with the Congress government of Narasimha Rao, 
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the country was slowly but steadily moving towards the US and therefore this was a con-
tinuation of a pro-US foreign policy. Dixit argues that this decision was in the first place 
driven by India’s national interest. Claiming to be a victim of international terrorism on its 
own soil for more than a decade, India naturally saw the opportunities of the new war in 
resolving its own profound security dilemma.183 At a joint press conference in New Delhi 
on 17 October, 2001 US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Indian External Affairs Min-
ister Jaswant Singh said the United States and India stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight 
against terrorism. They noted that the US and India were ‘natural allies’ having operated 
closely on terrorism prior to the September 11 attacks. In addition to discussing how the 
US and India could work together in advancing “the global coalition against terrorism”, 
Powell and Singh discussed the strengthening relations between the two countries.184 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s letter profusely congratulating George W. Bush on his 
re-election in 2005 as President was a clear testimony of the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) government’s intention to continue the friendly US policy initiated by the previous 
government. Manmohan Singh’s letter of congratulation was in effect a continuation of the 
offer of unconditional support to the United States eloquently expressed by his predecessor 
Atal Vajpayee. The White House must have accorded a special place to the letter from the 
Prime Minister, since no other leader of government, even among the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies of America, had expressed such great enthusiasm at the 
re-election of Bush.185 Manmohan Singh said in the letter that Bush had received a strong 
mandate, congratulated him for having brought India-US relations to a new level, and reit-
erated the Indian government’s commitment for a strategic partnership with the US. Singh 
also praised Bush for his leadership of the War on terror, adding: “we are confident that the 
US and India are on the same side in this effort”.186 While other world leaders like French 
President Jacques Chirac or German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder were calling for a mul-
tipolar world in their formal letters of congratulations to Bush, the Indian Prime Minister 
appeared to endorse the unilateralism of the one superpower as Empire. The letter clearly 
showed that there was absolutely no intention on the part of the UPA government to make 
any change in the pronounced pro-US stance the previous government had fashioned. In 
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the following Prime Minister Singh and President Bush worked on extending the relation-
ship. The two met in Washington D.C. in July 2005 and in New Delhi in March 2006. 
Prime Minister Singh and President Bush declared their resolve to transform the relation-
ship of US and India “to establish a global partnership”.187 They announced that both 
countries were “committed to values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the 
two countries will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the 
whole world”.188 The two countries pledged to create an international environment condu-
cive to promotion of democratic values and to combat terrorism relentlessly. 
 
 
3.3.2 Nuclear Deal 
 
According to Kumar the signing of an Indo-American Nuclear agreement during the Prime 
Minister’s visit to Washington in July 2005 was of great significance.189 The agreement 
known as Indo-US Nuclear Agreement aimed at separation of India’s civil and military 
nuclear facilities and at US resuming civil nuclear cooperation that was suspended after 
India’s first test in 1974. It was announced on behalf on the US that President George W. 
Bush committed himself to work to achieve “full civil nuclear cooperation with India” on 
the ground that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology India should ac-
quire the same benefits and advantages as other states”.190 The India-U.S. agreement on 
nuclear cooperation announced has been termed ‘historic’ by its supporters and detractors 
alike. The deal is about the most important strategic re-alignment of recent times for both 
countries, for which each side gave up historically entrenched positions.191 Bajora argues 
that the deal has a significant symbolic meaning.192 It serves to certify that US cooperation 
with India is a permanent one. Bose is convinced this deal will help deepen India-U. S. ties 
at the strategic level and help India develop its power-generation capacity. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
Summing up India’s relations with three of its most important neighbours – Pakistan, 
China and the Soviet Union – have been the most significant determining factors in India-
US relations. Changing governments had an impact on India’s US policy, but it is impor-
tant to note that global power considerations and India’s non-alignment policy dominated 
India’s US policy in all governments. The cold war dynamics and India’s non-alignment 
policy prevented India from deepening its political cooperation with the United States. 
Furthermore fundamental disputes over non-proliferation and the divergence over regional 
issues, in particular Pakistan, disturbed bilateral ties between India and the United States. 
The US-Pakistan alignment worked as a constant constraint to Indo-US relations. The 
Bangladesh crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan showed to which extent the US 
supported Pakistan politically and militarily. According to Mohan another reason why In-
dia and the United States never developed closer ties was the fact that the US misinter-
preted India’s non-alignment policy.193 The US assumed that non-alignment and its disso-
ciation from the western bloc meant stronger ties with the Soviet Union and at the same 
time also hostility towards the west. However, the above mentioned differences should not 
lead to the impression that Indo-US relations have been those of unrelieved tension; at 
times, it has been punctuated by brief intervals of warmth and friendly gestures well. To 
illustrate, both India and the United States were on the same side on the Suez Canal issue 
in 1956, again in 1959, when President Eisenhower visited India, he was given a warm 
welcome and the President on his part observed: "The strength of India is our interest."194 
Similarly, in October 1962, when China invaded India, America along with Britain came to 
support India and thereby saved it from a military disaster. 
 
Several major changes took place in the world at the beginning of the last decade of the 
twentieth century when the Cold War came to its end. The most significant consequence 
was that the United States became a supreme power and the leader of this unipolar world. 
For India, it became necessary to revise its foreign policy and to think about the role it 
wanted to play in a post-Cold War international system. Recognizing the fact that the 
United States was now the sole super power in the international system, India paid particu-
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lar attention to building a new relationship with Washington. However after improvements 
in the relationship in the early 1990s, two major flashpoints prevented closer ties: Nuclear 
proliferation and close US-Pakistan ties. The US still saw Pakistan as performing a useful 
role in counterbalancing India in South Asia, and thus in persuading the latter to act in ac-
cord with US policy. Bent as the US was on selective nuclear proliferation, and determined 
as India was to preserve its nuclear option until there was a commitment on the part of the 
permanent five for universal nuclear disbarment, the two powers seemed set on a collision 
course. The Indian nuclear test in 1998 seemed to have taken India-US relationship in 
worse times of the Cold War.  
            
In this context it was even more surprising that Prime Minister Vajpayee started to reorient 
Indian foreign Policy towards the United States following the nuclear tests in 1998. Just 
within 6 months after India had conducted its nuclear tests he used the word ‘alliance’ re-
ferring to the United States. That seemed to reflect a fundamental change in Indian foreign 
policy that had long sworn by ‘Non-alignment’. Moreover, on both flashpoints, nuclear 
weapons and Pakistan, Vajpayee changed the parameters of Indian foreign policy. The 
change in US policy that had been initiated by Prime Minister Vajpayee was carried for-
ward by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. India’s cooperation with the United States ac-
celerated with George W. Bush’s inauguration as the President of the United States in Jan-
uary 2001. India was one of the first countries to declare unequivocal support to the US 
War on Terror. In the following India and the United States particularly increased military-
to-military cooperation. Defence cooperation reached its peak when in 2005 the United 
States officially declared helping India become a major global power in the 21st century. 
The India-U.S. agreement on nuclear cooperation announced has been termed ‘historic’ by 
its supporters and detractors alike and can be the start of a closer relationship. Claiming 
that in the new century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a com-
mon interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international 
security, an engagement process started following the nuclear tests in 1998 that culminated 
in the nuclear deal in 2005. Though many intellectuals still claim that India maintains its 
historical commitment to non-alignment, there is little doubt that the overriding priority of 
Indian foreign policy is establishing a special relationship with the United States, which 
goes well beyond the real of nuclear cooperation by now. 
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4. Analyzing India’s Realignment towards the United 
States: A Liberalist Perspective  
 
 
4.1 Regime Type and Common Democratic Values 
 
Did the fact that both countries are democracies play a significant role in the realignment 
of Indian Foreign Policy towards the United States that started following the nuclear tests 
in 1998? According to liberalist theorists and the political leaders of both countries it did. 
Many bilateral official statements mention common democratic models and shared democ-
ratic values to be one of the main driving forces behind the recent shift.195 Addressing the 
Asia Society in 1999 former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee emphasized on 
India’s and the United States common democratic values to be the basis for a new strategic 
relationship196. In response President Bill Clinton decided to visit India as the first Ameri-
can President in 22 years and highlighted the importance of Indian democracy for a 
stronger India-US relationship197. Vajpayee’s successor, Manmohan Singh and Clinton’s 
successor, George W. Bush, declared their resolve to transform the relationship between 
India and the US to establish a global partnership that is committed to values of human 
freedom, democracy and rule of law.198  
 
These statements of political leaders of both countries are supported by liberal theories of 
democratic peace. According to democratic peace theorists democracies share common 
democratic values such as human rights, the commitment to solve conflicts peacefully and 
the rule of law.199 Therefore, according to Bruce Russet, democracies tend to develop simi-
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lar social identities. He states that a similar social identity creates a similar political culture 
in democratic states, which functions as the basic driver of a state’s foreign policy.200 Con-
sequently, it may be understood that in line with ideas of democratic peace theory, com-
mon regime models and shared democratic values guided India’s foreign policy closer to 
the United States.  
 
When evaluating the current debate of common regime type and common democratic val-
ues and their influence on the shift in India’s US policy, Dheeraj Kumar argues that first of 
all one has to emphasize the circumstance that both countries have been democracies long 
before India realigned its foreign policy towards the United States. The United States of 
America is a democracy since 1776 and India became one in 1947. Democracy has been a 
stable factor throughout the shift of India’s US policy that started following the nuclear 
tests in 1998. Hence this study will compare the role democracy played in India’s US pol-
icy before and after the shift. If, in line with liberalist, democracy played a major role in 
the shift of India’s US policy one automatically has to draw the conclusion that democracy 
and shared values did not have influence prior to the shift. Why did not regime type and 
common democratic values play a role in India’s US policy earlier? In line with this rea-
soning this chapter will analyze the impact of democracy on Indian foreign policy from a 
historical perspective. It is therefore essential to examine the role democracy played until 
the recent shift.   
 
 
4.1.1 Cold War Priorities: Nonalignment over Democracy 
 
According to Kumar, in the aftermath of India’s independence India and the United States 
being the two largest democracies in the world were expected to develop very close and 
cooperative relations.201 On the basis of common values and regime type many expected a 
period of strong cooperation to follow.202 However, while analysing Indian foreign policy 
in the years after independence, C. Raja Mohan recognizes that democracy as a political 
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priority has largely been absent from India’s foreign policy agenda.203 Instead of following 
Cold War power politics and joining the United States in its fight against communism, 
India decided to follow an independent foreign policy: the so called ‘Non-Alignment Doc-
trine’.204 According to Dennis Kux, New Delhi’s conspicuous lack of emphasis on democ-
racy in its engagement with the world is largely a consequence of the Cold War’s impact 
on South Asia and India’s nonaligned impulses in the early years of independence.205 It 
attached more importance to solidarity with fellow developing countries and the defence of 
its own national security interests without referring to ideology at the operational level.206 
The injection of anti-imperialism into ‘Non-Alignment’ and the identification of the Soviet 
Union as a natural ally of the developing world consolidated this formulation of Indian 
foreign policy. As India drifted toward economic populism and a leftist orientation starting 
in the 1960s, India’s foreign policy articulation increasingly acquired a strident anti-
Western undertone and remained far from emphasizing democracy as a political priority.207 
As the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) became radicalized, the vision of a declining capi-
talist West and a rising socialist East gripped the imagination of Third World leaders. As 
the North-South ideological battles dominated world politics, India saw itself leading the 
accusation in restructuring the global order against the West. Democracy was no factor in 
foreign policy or in India’s relationship towards the US in particular. Equally undermining 
liberalist ideas in India was the ongoing fascination with socialism among the founders of 
the Indian republic. Many nationalist Indians grew up during the crises in Western capital-
ism in the 1920s and the impressive economic performance of the Soviet Union. They 
were convinced that socialism was the fastest means to improve the economical and politi-
cal situation in India. Although most of them were not willing to give up freedom for the 
sake of socialism, they were certain that a middle path, a model between Western capital-
ism and eastern communism existed.208  
 
In contrast to Indian foreign policy, democracy was part of the United States foreign policy 
rhetoric since the Second World War. However, India had good reason to distrust US 
rhetoric on liberal democracy. Though American foreign policy was directed against com-
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munism, it did not necessarily support democratic states in the rest of the world. During the 
Cold War the Americans opted to support several right-winged military governments as an 
alternative to the greater evil of global communism. According to C. Raja Mohan liberal 
US rhetoric on democracy often drew cynical jeers from the Indian intelligentsia, who 
pointed to the close relationship between the US and military-ruled Pakistan.209 The US 
policy of supporting military dictatorships and conservative religious forces within the 
developing world, as part of its effort to contain the influence of communism, created deep 
anxieties within the Indian establishment. As it witnessed several military coups undermine 
nationalist regimes and a lately founded democracy in the newly decolonized states, India 
was anxious that its own democracy might be targeted by the West.210  
 
Summing up, during the Cold War years, external and internal factors combined to prevent 
India from highlighting the relevance of democracy in its foreign policy agenda. Internally 
socialist ideas prevented democracy to be a factor of Indian foreign policy. Externally sys-
temic factors played a dominant role. To put it simply, the impact of the Cold War on the 
subcontinent resulted, in the US democracy aligning with military-ruled Pakistan and 
Communist-led People’s Republic of China. India in turn found itself in the company of 
the Soviet Union. Once this balance of power system acquired a measure of rigidity, India 
and the United States could not build on their shared political values. Even though both of 
them often emphasized the significance of political pluralism, there was no escaping the 
fact that India was not merely closer to the Soviet Union but also the only country that 
stood outside the system of US alliances and in political opposition to the West on many 
international issues. ‘Estranged democracies’ became the defining metaphor of India-US 
relations.211 
 
 
4.1.2. After the Cold War 
 
According to Dheeraj Kumar and C. Raja Mohan, after the end of the Cold War era many 
expected democracy to play a more important role since systemic constraints had disap-
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peared.212 However, while the Western world celebrated the victory of liberal democracy 
over authoritarian forms of governance at the turn of the 1990s, the world’s largest democ-
racy had very little reason to cheer at the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having established 
a deep strategic partnership with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India had more 
reason to worry than to celebrate. India did not envision itself as a leading democracy in 
the world. On the contrary, it was more fearful of US dominance in a unipolar world rather 
than recognizing the triumph of democratic principles. India, although highly sensitive to 
any violation of democratic principles within its nation, seemed totally insensitive to the 
international values of political liberalism.213 Furthermore, C. Raja Mohan argues that the 
expansion of the liberalist approach in US foreign policy did not lead to US recognition of 
the strategic value of Indian democracy.214 According to Mohan it ironically led to an em-
phasis of the shortcomings of the ‘Indian democratic experiment’; as the Americans la-
belled Indian democracy at that time. Organizations in the United States focusing on hu-
man rights, developmental issues or those, seeking a linkage between trade and child la-
bour concentrated strongly on India’s problems in these areas.215 When issues relating de-
mocracy occurred, they arose as a result of US criticism towards India for the human rights 
violations in Kashmir, which New Delhi viewed as part of the traditional US alliance with 
Pakistan.216 Furthermore the continuing US coalition with Pakistan and the US shift to-
ward Islamabad in its dispute with New Delhi on the Kashmir issue convinced many po-
litical experts in India that Washington had little concern for its unity and territorial integ-
rity.217 On the international political arena, the Clinton administration focused on renewed 
multilateralism and strengthening of the United Nations using the right to intervene in the 
internal affairs of developing nations, a policy which raised high anxiety in India about 
potential US plans to intervene in Kashmir.218 India subsequently opposed the new interna-
tional interventionist agenda of US President Bill Clinton and UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan by voting against or occasionally abstaining on Western resolutions throughout the 
1990s and beyond.219 India was supported by many Third World Countries in rejecting 
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Pakistani resolutions on the political solution in Kashmir. Mohan concludes that India’s 
foreign policy agenda viewed the defence of the political sovereignty of third world coun-
tries as more important than defending the values of democracy.220 
 
 
4.1.3 1998 – Realignment of India’s Foreign Policy 
 
Building a new relationship with the United States was one of the major foreign policy 
goals of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was voted into office in 1998. In 
order to achieve that objective, democratic peace theorists argue, that he emphasized 
shared democratic values as part of Indian foreign policy towards the United States.221 This 
was made clear when he declared at the end of September – barely four month after India 
conducted its nuclear tests – in a speech in New York that India and the US were ‘natural 
allies’.222 According to V. N. Khanna, Vajpayee referred to the term ‘natural’ in the sense 
that both countries are democracies and it therefore would be only natural if they engage in 
a closer relationship.223 Vajpayee was positive about a potential alliance between the two 
countries, the formerly ‘estranged democracies’. All that was needed was a little sensitivity 
from the American side for India’s security concerns. In the same speech addressing the 
Asia Society in 1998, Vajpayee pointed to the growing convergence of Indian and Ameri-
can political interests and declared that it “reinforces my belief that India and the United 
States are natural allies in the quest for a better future for the world in the 21st Century.”224 
For the first time, as Kumar argues, common regime type started to play a more important 
role in India’s foreign policy towards the United States.225  
 
According to Mohan the first US presidential visit to India in 22 years by Bill Clinton in 
the spring of 2000 was the first time Washington recognized the existence of Indian de-
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mocracy.226 Even though India caused a lot of international problems by deciding to con-
duct nuclear weapon tests in 1998, Clinton was looking for a bigger and brighter picture of 
India. Its resilient democracy, its vibrant IT sector, its liberal reforms to revitalize its static 
and growing economy, along with its huge consumer market made it in Clinton’s view a 
natural beneficiary of globalization and therefore a potentially more important partner for 
the United States.227 To start things off, Clinton recognized the extraordinary diversity of 
the country during his visit. His celebration of India’s multiculturalism put democracy on 
the agenda of India-US relations. By emphasizing shared values and similar political cul-
ture, Clinton tried to re-establish lost trust between the countries. Although Clinton im-
proved Indian-US relations and successfully eliminated much of the negative tensions that 
had existed during the Cold War, India’s struggle to adjust to the changes in the new world 
order persisted. Strobe Talbott reports that during the first-ever sustained political and se-
curity dialogue between the US and India from 1998 to 2000, the Clinton administration 
sought Indian support for an initiative to promote democracy worldwide.228 Yet, India was 
sceptical whether the new connection with Washington on promoting democracy would 
help to change the fundamentals of Indian foreign policy towards the US. According to 
Talbott, India was first and foremost interested in US acceptance of India’s nuclear status, 
its neutrality in the conflict with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir, and the treatment of 
New Delhi as an equal to Beijing.229  India realized that by supporting US efforts in pro-
moting democracy it could gain a better bargaining position on the US supporting India in 
their interests. For this reason India would not out rightly reject the Clinton administra-
tion’s proposal on working together on democracy promotion. Clinton’s plan was to create 
a small core group of democratic states representing different regions of the world. Also 
Talbott states that India was at first very reluctant to join any kind organization.230 It had to 
think about the implications of joining what undoubtedly was an ideological project. Indian 
foreign policy experts in the tradition of multilateralism disapproved to letting a new po-
litical style replace the well-known ways of doing politics with the United Nations (UN). 
However, the political leadership of the centre-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which 
was attempting to reorient Indian foreign policy, chose to go along cautiously with Clin-
                                                          
226 Mohan, C. Raja (2007): “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy Promotion”, 
in The Washington Quarterly, 30:3, p. 99-115. 
227 Talbott, Strobe (2004): “Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb”, Penguin Group, New 
York. 
228 Ibid. p. 25. 
229 Ibid. p. 25. 
230 Ibid. p. 25. 
 71 
ton’s proposal. In 1999, India became one of the 10 founding members of the Community 
of Democracies Initiative231. The 10 countries, meeting at the ministerial level, issued a 
concept paper declaring the first-ever platform of nations sharing the same political values 
“providing best practices, and formulating an agenda for international cooperation in order 
to realize democracy’s full potential.“232 According to Mohan, it is important to note that 
India decided to go along the proposal not because it was so enthusiastic about the project 
but because it was trying to engage with the United States to make sure other, and for India 
much more important issues, are realized.233 Joining the Community of Democracies Initia-
tive was an essential step in doing so. Given this, India was still very cautious to put much 
effort into the project.234 The scepticism of the Indian conservatives was reflected in an 
assessment by B. Raman on the eve of the Warsaw conference in April 24, 2000: 
 
“There is no harm in India participating in the forthcoming Warsaw conference on 
the Community of Democracies… [but] over-enthusiasm and wishful-thinking that 
India is now an equal partner would be unwise… We should avoid letting ourselves 
be used by Washington in this venture to advance its interests unless there is a 
genuine convergence of the interests of the United States and India”.235 
 
Thus, India went along with the United States on the Community of Democracies Initiative, 
but it was not willing to invest significant political or diplomatic energies into the project. 
The statement made by Raman reflects basic ideas of Indian foreign policy at that time. 
While India was ready to go along with the US on democracy promotion, it expected 
something in return for doing so. Mohan argues that the reason for joining such an initia-
tive was not India’s believe in the promotion of democracy. India saw it as a necessarily 
step to increase over-all relationship and secure its own interests, which it could do only 
with the support of the United States.236  
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According to Dennis Kux democracy became a more important issue in 2005 when Prime 
Minister Singh and President Bush worked on extending the relationship.237 In a statement 
released on May 30 in 2005, Bush argued “that India and the United States being the two 
largest democracies in the world have similar political cultures, a free press and the rule of 
law.”238 Bush and Singh met in Washington D. C. in July 2005 and in New Delhi in March 
2006. Prime Minister Singh and President Bush declared their resolve to transform the re-
lationship of US and India to establish a global partnership. In the ‘India-US Joint State-
ment’ they announced that both countries are “committed to values of human freedom, 
democracy and rule of law, the two countries will promote stability, democracy, prosperity 
and peace throughout the whole world239”. In line with democratic peace theory the two 
countries pledged to create an international environment conducive to promotion of de-
mocratic values and to combat terrorism relentlessly.240 On this occasion Democratic 
Peace theorists saw a unique opportunity to posit democracy a fundamental aspect in In-
dia’s foreign policy.241 Based on the liberalist assumption that domestic actors with their 
beliefs and ideas have the ability to strongly influence foreign policy identities, liberalist 
argue that it was Bush’s and Singh’s personal affinity towards democracy that made re-
gime type and common democratic values play a decisive role in India’s foreign policy. 
George W. Bush was clearly impressed with the Indian development and its fast and multi-
cultural democracy. As one adviser said, “When I asked […] Bush in early 1999 about the 
reasons for his obvious and special interests in India, he immediately responded”, “a bil-
lion people in a functioning democracy. Isn’t that something? Isn’t that something?”242 
Bush personal enthusiasm translated into policy initiatives toward India that departed from 
the traditional approach to the region. Unlike his predecessors, who mostly saw India 
through the limiting prism of the sub continental security dynamic especially vis a vis 
Pakistan, Bush was prepared to rank New Delhi as a potential major power with global 
significance. This addressed India’s long-standing complaints that Washington had little 
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regard for New Delhi’s global aspirations. However, as Mohan states Bush’s personal en-
thusiasm for democracy was not equally shared by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.243 
Singh was more concerned with other issues. According to Koshy he emphasised nuclear 
non-proliferation and defence cooperation as the most important issues on the Indian 
agenda.244 Like Vajpayee, Singh knew that he needed US support for India in order to 
achieve its main policy goals. Therefore, Koshy argues that Singh decided to go along with 
President Bush’s efforts on regime type and democratic values and at the same time coax-
ing the United States to support India in other political issues of international relevance.245 
 
 
4.1.4 Conclusion 
 
This paper concludes that regime type and common democratic values cannot explain the 
realignment of India’s foreign policy towards the United States that started following the 
nuclear tests in 1998.  
 
At first, to support this conclusion this paper has shown that India and the United States 
have been democracies long before India started to realign its foreign policy towards the 
United States in 1998. Looking at India’s foreign policy towards the United States from a 
historical perspective, this paper recognizes that democracy did not play an important role 
during the Cold War and its aftermath until 1998. Cold War political realism overwhelmed 
democracy as a factor in India’s foreign policy agenda.246 The impact of the Cold War on 
the subcontinent resulted, to put it simply, in the U.S. democracy aligning with military-
ruled Pakistan and Communist-led People’s Republic of China. India in turn engaged in 
closer ties with the Soviet Union. Once this balance of power system was strengthened, 
India and the United States could not build closer ties based on their shared political val-
ues. According to Ninan Koshy it is important to note that Liberalists admit that an alliance 
based on regime type and democratic values existed but that other factors overshadowed 
the role they have played.247 Mohan states that this illustrates the limited role of democracy 
in India – U.S. relations. With the end of the Cold War many foreign policy experts ex-
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pected democracy to play a bigger role now that systemic constraints had disappeared.248 
However, the victory of democracy over communism did not result in India making de-
mocracy a factor in its foreign policy towards the United States immediately. On the con-
trary, as Mohan and Koshy have shown, it led to the US emphasizing on the shortcomings 
of the ‘Indian democratic experiment’.249 
  
Secondly, regime type and common democratic values only came to play a role in India’s 
foreign policy towards the United States when India started to engage with the United 
States using the democracy issue as a pretext to realign its foreign policy closer towards 
the United States.250 Liberalist scholars argue that with the entry of Prime Minister Va-
jpayee in 1998 regime type and common democratic values started to play a more domi-
nant role in India’s foreign policy agenda. Based on the liberalist assumption that domestic 
actors with their beliefs and ideas have the ability to strongly influence foreign policy iden-
tities, Kumar argues that it was Vajpayee’s and Singh’s personal enthusiasm with democ-
racy that made regime type and common democratic values play a decisive role in India’s 
foreign policy.251 This paper holds that the liberalist line of reasoning is inconsistent. In 
line with Koshy and Mohan this paper states that Vajpayee and Singh were aware that 
former Presidents Clinton and Bush were in fact eager to place democracy as a central as-
pect in the relationship.252 But while Vajpayee and Singh were proclaiming the importance 
of democracy in many official statements, they were very cautious in making any real po-
litical efforts in the direction of democracy promotion in relations with the United States. 
Summing up this paper argues that Vajpayee and Singh supported Clinton’s and Bush’s 
democratic efforts as part of a greater strategy to strengthen the over-all relationship be-
tween the two countries. This paper concludes that India only took advantage on engaging 
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with the United States on the democracy topic to make sure that other (and for India much 
more important) issues are realized.253  
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4.2 Economic Ties  
 
 
Economic cooperation between India and the United States has been steadily increasing in 
the last two decades. While the total trade volume stood at 7.8 billion dollars in 1990, it 
improved to almost 41 billion dollars in 2008. According to official statements and scho-
lars in the tradition of economic interdependence theory, increased economic ties had a 
positive effect on the overall relationship between India and the United States.254 In line 
with this reasoning, increased economic cooperation played an important role in the shift 
of India's foreign policy towards closer ties with the United States following the nuclear 
tests in 1998.255 
 
 
4.2.1 Economic Ties: From Independence till Today 
 
This chapter will start by analyzing economic data between India and the United States 
from India’s independence in 1947 till 2008. The “CRS Report for Congress: India-U.S. 
Economic and Trade Relations “ and the report of the Indian Industry Confederation “In-
dia – USA Economic Relations: The Next Decade” state that trade and investment reforms 
implemented by India in 1991 have generally promoted improved trade relations with the 
United States.256 Regardless of which nation’s trade statistics are considered, the total val-
ue of trade between India and the United States has picked up considerably over the last 
twenty-five years. According to US trade statistics the entire value of bilateral trade with 
India totalled 4.0 billion dollars in 1986. By 2008 the total value of bilateral trade has risen 
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to 41 billion dollars - a more than tenfold increase. 257 However, the report makes another 
important observation. It states that, despite the rapid growth in the total value of trade, the 
proportion to which both nations contribute to each others total trade has declined marked-
ly since the late 1960s – a decline from which  neither has  recovered yet258. Figure 1 
shows the value of India's exports to and imports from the United States from 1958 to 
2008, according to data reported by the Indian government to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The statistic indicates that trade between the two countries was relatively low 
from 1958 to 1985. Only since the mid-1980s, US imports from India have steadily in-
creased in value while India's exports to the United States have increased dramatically. 
 
Figure1. India's Trade with the United States, 
1958-2008 in U.S. $ Billions259 
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Despite the recent strong growth in trade flows in both directions, the relative importance 
of the US for India's imports has actually declined over the last 40 years, while its share of 
India's exports has rebounded (Figure 2). In the mid 1960s, almost 20 percent of India's 
exports went to the United States and the United States supplied India with nearly 40 per-
cent of its imports. By 1980, the relative importance of the United States for India had de-
clined substantially, purchasing just over 10 percent of India's exports and providing less 
than 10 per cent of its imports. In 2008, the United States purchased 15.4 per cent of In-
dia’s exports — almost five per cent less as in 1961 — and  made up for  9 per cent of In-
dias’s  imports – more than 6 per cent less  compared to 1961.260  
 
Figure 2. U.S. Share of India's Trade, 
1958 – 2008261 
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4.2.2 Increased Economic Cooperation and India’s Foreign Policy towards the United 
States before the Shift in 1998 
 
In order to understand the relationship of increased economic cooperation and the two 
states’ over-all relations after India realigned its US policy in 1998 this paper analyzes 
economic cooperation and its impact on India-U.S. relations between 1947 and 1998. This 
chapter will pay specific attention to times when economic cooperation significantly in-
creased (1972-1979 and 1991-1998) and analyze the impact on the states’ overall relations. 
 
 
1972-79: Increased economic cooperation 
 
Economic Interdependence theorists hold that increased economic cooperation between 
two states has positive effects on the states’ overall relations. Looking at Figure 1, this pa-
per observes that economic cooperation between India and the United States heavily im-
proved between 1972 and 1979. The value of trade increased from 0.3 billion dollar in 
1972 to 2.2 billion dollar in 1976 — a more than seven-fold growth in only four years. In 
1979 the value of trade had risen to over 3 billion dollar – a ten-fold increase from 1972 to 
1979. In line with economic interdependence theory the countries’ overall relations should 
have enhanced significantly during that time period. Analyzing the political relationship 
this paper comes to a different conclusion. In Chapter 3 this paper shows that India’s for-
eign policy towards the United States in the 1970s was shaped by tension and disagree-
ment.262 The India-Pakistan war of December 1971 resulted in serious political anxiety 
between India and the United States. During the crisis and war, the United States had sup-
ported Pakistan both politically and militarily. According to Nayar and Paul a violent con-
frontation between the U.S. and India was only avoided because India, having accom-
plished its war aims, brought the conflict to a quick end.263 The consequence of the Bang-
ladesh crisis was a big divide between India and the United States. The result was that In-
dia gradually strengthened ties with the Soviet Union leading to the ‘Indo-Soviet Friend-
ship Treaty’ in 1971. Although the treaty was stated to be a political one, it sounded more 
like a military alliance to counter China and Pakistan in particular and the US in general.264 
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According to Verinder Govinder the treaty was another clear sign that India was further 
moving away from the United States and strengthening its political and military ties with 
the Soviet Union.265 However the tensions between India and the U.S. did not have any 
negative effects on the economic relations between both countries.266 On the contrary, as 
Figure 1 suggests, economic ties experienced serious growth following the ratification of 
the ‘Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971’. While economic cooperation continued to 
increase throughout the beginning of the 1970s (Figure 1.), political relations between In-
dia and the US experienced another serious drawback in 1974. On May 18 1974, India 
tested its first nuclear device at Pokhran. The United States was highly critical and felt that 
the explosion might lead to nuclear proliferation throughout South Asia. In conclusion, 
economic cooperation increased heavily while at the same time political relations experi-
enced major tension and disagreement. Increased economic cooperation did not have posi-
tive influence on India’s foreign policy towards the United States between 1972 and 1979. 
On the contrary, India moved further away from the U.S. by signing the ‘Indo-Soviet 
Friendship Treaty’ in 1971 and testing nuclear devices 1974. 
 
 
India’s Opening of its Economy in 1991 
 
As Figure 1 suggests, economic cooperation was fairly stagnant during the 1980s. Only 
with the opening of the Indian economy in 1991 did economic cooperation begin to rise. 
According to Figure 1, economic cooperation between India and the US in terms of total 
trade volume more than doubled between 1991 and 1998. However, as Dixit observes dur-
ing the same time period India – US relations did not improve significantly. Ignoring In-
dia's pleas, the US kept on supplying arms to Pakistan. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
American military assistance to Pakistan reached an all-time high. Moreover, according to 
J. N. Dixit there was still no agreement on the nuclear issue. India felt that the United 
States was not taking India seriously on its nuclear aspirations.267 The U.S. argued that 
India should remain without nuclear weapons to ensure its security and not start a nuclear 
arms race in the South Asian region. Engagement therefore proved to be fruitless: “Indo – 
US political relations were in despair even as economic relations continued to expand.”268  
  
                                                          
265 Ibid, p. 165. 
266 Ibid, p. 165. 
267 Dixit, J. N. (2003): “India’s Foreign Policy and its Neighbours”, Gyan Books, New Delhi, p. 203. 
268 Ibid. p. 203. 
 81 
 
4.2.3 Increased Economic Cooperation and India’s Foreign Policy towards the United 
States after the Shift in 1998 
 
 
India’s Realignment in U.S. Policy in 1998 
 
Political relations between India and the United States only started to improve subsequent 
to the nuclear tests in 1998. Paradoxically it was at this time that economic cooperation in 
total and relative terms was nearly stagnant (as Figure 1 indicates). The total value of trade 
increased only from 11 billion dollar in 1998 to 12.5 billion dollar in 2001 while the rela-
tive importance in terms of exports and imports remained at the same level.269 Dixit states 
that if economic ties were a main driving force of the realignment process that started in 
1998, one would have expected economic cooperation to have significantly increased fol-
lowing the realignment process that started in 1998.270  
 
 
Increased Economic Cooperation after 2001  
 
According to Figure 1 after 2001, economic cooperation started to rise rapidly again. In 
line with trade statistics in 2001 the total value of bilateral trade between India and the 
United States stood at 12.2 billion dollar. By 2008 the total value of bilateral trade had ris-
en to 41 billion. However, as Figure 2 indicates economic ties improved only in terms of 
total numbers but decreased in relative terms. In 2008, the United States purchased 15.4 
per cent of India’s exports — more than five per cent less as in 2001 (21.1 per cent) — and 
provided India with 9 per cent of its imports – only one per cent more as in 2001 (8 per 
cent). While economic cooperation in total numbers increased, at the same time the relative 
importance of the United State’s economy to India’s economy decreased. Consequently 
economic interdependence theory can not be applied when interdependence between In-
dia’s and the United State’s economies actually decreased271. By engaging with other eco-
nomic powerhouses in the world, India started to reduce its dependence on the American 
                                                          
269 Ibid. p. 205. 
270 Ibid, p. 203 
271 Kumar, Nagesh (2009): “India and broader economic integration in Asia: An agenda for the East Asia 
Summit”, in: “Indian Foreign Policy”, edited by Motha, Madhup and Sinha, Artish, Foreign Service Institute, 
New Delhi. 
 82 
economy.272 The most significant development in India’s engagement with other econo-
mies in the world is, and as Kumar notes “very surprisingly with the Chinese economy”.273 
In line with Kumar it is surprising because India and China experienced a diplomatic stan-
doff following the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 that were directed against China.274 
 
 
4.2.4 Sino-Indian Economic Ties 
 
This paper has shown that after 2001 the relative importance of the U.S. economy to India 
has been steadily declining. At the same time economic cooperation in total and relative 
numbers between India and China increased intensively. According to India’s trade statis-
tics, China became India’s leading source of imports in 2004 and India's biggest trading 
partner in terms of total trade volume in 2006, displacing the United States (see Figure 3). 
In 2000, India's imports from the U.S. were worth nearly 2.9 billion dollars — more than 
three times the value of India's imports from China. By 2004, India's imports from China 
totaled 5.9 billion dollars, and the imports from the U.S. were 5.1 billion dollars. In 2008, 
India's imports from the U.S. Totaled 20.4 billion dollars, but imports from china had risen 
to 31.5 billion dollars.  
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Figure.3 India's Trade with China in $ billion, 
2000-2008275 
 
 
The value of India’s exports to China increased from 0.7 billion dollars in 2000 to 20.3 
billion dollars in 2008 —more than a 25-fold increase. As a result, India’s total trade with 
the United States rose from 12.2 billion dollars in 2000 to 41.7 billion dollars in 2008, 
while its total trade with China jumped from 2.2 billion dollars to 51.8 billion dollars. 
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Figure4. India's Trade with the United States and China in $ billion, 
2000-2008276 
 
 
In conclusion, India’s trade with China - in absolute terms and relative importance - has 
increased dramatically since 2001. It is also important to note that it has grown more rapid-
ly than trade with the United States. As a result, China has already surpassed the United 
States as India’s leading source of imports in 2004 and became India's biggest trading 
partner in 2006. In line with interdependence theory, the overall relations between India 
and China should have improved in the meantime. However, many scholars observed that 
increased economic cooperation between India and China led to serious tension in the re-
cent years.277 While the Sino-Indian economic relationship is improving very fast, funda-
mental concerns remain that have shown little sign of resolution. On the Indian side, the 
most worrying sign in the trade relationship is the emerging trade deficit with China.278 In 
2004, the balance of trade was 1.7 billion dollars in India's favor. By 2006, this surplus had 
turned to a 4.12 billion dollar deficit, widening further last year to 11.2 billion dollars, with 
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Indian exports of 20.3 billion dollars overshadowed by imports from China worth 31.5 
billion dollars.279 India is thus reluctant to grant China market economy status, a first step 
towards negotiation of the proposed regional trade agreement. Currently, India is a leading 
initiator of anti dumping cases against China. Moreover Indians worry over the composi-
tion of exports and fear Chinese trade barriers hindering Indian companies from breaking 
into the Chinese market successfully.280 Neither has there been significant progress to-
wards removing non-tariff barriers erected against Indian products. According to Ayar Pal-
lavi Sino-Indian economic relations are a good example that increased economic ties do 
not necessarily have a positive impact on the over-all relations of two countries.281  
 
 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
 
Firstly, by analyzing increased economic cooperation and its impact on the states over-all 
relations from a historical perspective, this paper concludes that there is no cohesion be-
tween increased economic cooperation and the over-all relations between India and the 
United States. This paper has shown that in phases of increased economic cooperation 
(1972-1979 and 1991-1998) the overall relationship was characterized by tension. While 
economic ties increased heavily between 1972 and 1979, at the same time political rela-
tions experienced major disturbance and disagreement. Increased economic cooperation 
did not have positive influence on India’s foreign policy towards the United States. On the 
contrary, India moved further away from the US by signing the ‘Indo-Soviet Friendship 
Treaty’ in 1971 and testing nuclear devices 1974. Following the opening of the Indian 
economy in 1991, total and relative trade volume began increasing significantly. However, 
India – US relations remained fairly stagnant in the years after the opening of the Indian 
economy.282 If, according to economic interdependence theory,  economics have a decisive 
impact on India – US ties, one might have expected relations to have improved dramati-
cally following India's economic liberalization in the early 1990’s.283 
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Secondly, this paper has shown that while political relations between India and the United 
States started to improve following the nuclear tests in 1998, economic cooperation in total 
and relative terms was stagnant between 1998 and 2001 (Figure 1). Economic cooperation 
started to increase only after 2001. However this paper has given evidence that economic 
cooperation improved only in terms of total numbers, but decreased in terms of relative 
importance. In line with Kumar Nagesh, India significantly increased economic coopera-
tion with other countries while it slowly but steadily decreased its economic dependence 
on the United States. 284 The conclusion Nagesh draws is very simple and straight-forward: 
The economic interdependence theory can not explain the shift of India’s foreign policy 
towards the United States that began following the nuclear tests in 1998 because the eco-
nomic interdependence between the two countries did not increase. On the contrary, by 
engaging with other economic giants (e. g. China or the European Union) of the world, 
India started to reduce its dependence on the American economy.285 Sino-Indian economic 
relations have shown that increased economic ties do not consequentially lead to a positive 
impact on the overall relations. This paper has illustrated the development of Sino – Indian 
economic ties to prove two points: 
 
1. Increased economic cooperation can also lead to political tensions. 
2. India is steadily decreasing its economic dependence on the United States by 
strengthening economic ties with countries they do not share friendly political rela-
tions with.  
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5. Analyzing India’s Realignment towards the United States: A 
Realist Perspective 
 
In keeping with the realist school of thought on international relations the fundamental 
purpose of India’s foreign policy – and for that matter of any other nations’ – is to serve 
the country’s national interest.286 In the hierarchy of national interest, national security 
occupies the pre-eminent position.287 The realist argument is basically that, unless a state is 
secure it cannot be sure that it will survive and, if it does not survive, it will not be able to 
fulfill any other goals favoring its citizens’ welfare. Structural-realist scholars also identify 
national security issues as the most important factor in explaining the realignment process 
in India’s foreign policy towards the United States following the nuclear tests in 1998.288 
They argue that a rising China presented and continues to pose the biggest threat to India’s 
national security environment. In order to cope with this threat, India engaged with the 
United States in a balancing act to contain Chinese power in Asia.  
 
Firstly, this chapter will explain how India’s security environment fundamentally changed 
after the Cold War and then argue that changes in that environment impelled India to seek 
the support of the United States. Secondly, by appropriating the ‘Balance of Threat 
Theory’ as a conceptual framework, China is analyzed as the biggest threat to India’s na-
tional security in the short-, medium- and long-terms. Thirdly, this chapter will analyze the 
nature of India and the United States engagement in a strategic partnership following the 
nuclear tests in 1998. This paper will show that the partnership was primarily concerned 
with defense cooperation. Furthermore, it will show that the partnership is aimed against a 
rising China in Asia. 
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India’s Changed Security Environment after the Cold War  
 
According to C. Raja Mohan, India’s security environment prior to the nuclear tests in 
1998 was equally challenging as after, both in terms of convential and nuclear threats. Pa-
kistan’s continued hostility and uncertainties regarding China’s policies as it acquired 
greater power in all aspects impinged vitally on India’s regional security. Moreover terror-
ism on Indian soil continued to be a constant threat with increasing potential for disrup-
tion.289 According to Mohan, to answer the question as to why India and the United States 
engaged in closer relations subsequent to 1998, one has to analyze the Indian security envi-
ronment prior to the realignment in India’s US policy. In keeping with Mohan one might 
expect India’s security environment to have changed significantly before the shift in its US 
policy.290 Thus opines Jürgen Bellers “any major shift in the strategy of foreign policy of a 
country is only to be expected when there is a major […] change in the environment of the 
international political system.”291 Consequently, the international system and therefore, 
India’s security environment must have changed significantly prior to the shift in its for-
eign policy towards the United States in 1998. As Mohan states: “If the security environ-
ment did not change fundamentally in the 1990s, there would not have been any urgent 
need for India to change its strategy to cope with its security threats.”292 Devendra Kaushik 
posits that the end of the Cold War led to major changes in the international political sys-
tem and can be identified as a fundamental change in the environment of the international 
political system.293 The bipolar world order of the Cold War was thrown apart leading to a 
changed security environment for almost every state. India was no exception. This had two 
major implications for India’s security environment:294 
 
 Firstly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, India not only lost its largest and 
most significant trading partner, but also its most important supporter and ally with 
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regard to national security. The diplomatic shield of the Soviet Union against 
India’s main national security threats, Pakistan and China, was no longer in 
place.295  
 Secondly, the rise of China was the most important element in the new emerging 
balance of power in Asia in the 1990s. The pace and scope of China’s military 
build-up would have put regional military balances at risk in a medium- and long-
term perspective.296  
Consequently for India, it became necessary to analyze the changed security environment, 
identify its implications and revise its foreign policy accordingly. While India had the mili-
tary capabilities to ensure its security against the threat imposed by Pakistan even without 
the help of the Soviet Union, it was unable to ensure the same with regard to China.297 In-
dia feared that an all too powerful China might pose a security threat which it could not 
handle on its own. Therefore, India concluded that it had to find new strategies to deal with 
the threat.  
 
How did India cope with the changed security environment and the steadily increasing 
Chinese threat? According to structural realists the best means to ensure one’s own securi-
ty is to gain more power itself. The state must possess the military wherewithal, either 
alone or in alliance with other countries, to thwart military threats to its security.298 Pre-
viously India enjoyed important military cooperation from the Soviet Union. India soon 
recognized that the United States remained the sole super power in the international system 
and began paying particular attention to building a new relationship with Washington.299 In 
line with structural realists this paper holds that India followed a ‘Balance of Threat’ strat-
egy to handle the changed security environment and the threat posed by China and sought 
to increase its own military capabilities (internal balancing), and established a formal al-
liance with the United States (external balancing) to preserve its own national interest by 
checking the power of the opposing side (China).300 To explain the realignment process 
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that started following the nuclear tests in 1998 this paper uses the ‘Balance of Threat 
Theory’ as its theoretical framework.  
 
 
5.1 Balance of Threat Theory – Containing China 
 
‘Balance of Threat Theory’ argues that states will balance against threats. Threat, is driven 
by a combination of three key variables:  
a) aggregate capabilities,  
b) geography,  
and  
c) Perceptions of aggressive attentions.301  
If one state becomes especially powerful and if its location and behavior feed threat per-
ceptions on the part of other states, then balancing strategies will come to dominate the 
foreign policy of the threatened state.302  
 
 
a) Aggregate Capabilities 
 
‘Balance of Threat Theory’ states that a country’s aggregate capabilities have to impose a 
future threat on the balancing countries. China’s rapid economic growth over almost three 
decades accompanied by its military modernization has made it the primary power in Asia. 
In the last two decades, China has been the fastest growing economy in the world.303 It 
continues to invest heavily in its military; particularly in programs designed to improve 
power projection.304 According to the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) released by the 
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US Department of Defence of 2006, the pace and scope of China’s military build-up was 
likely to put regional military balances at risk.305 The report identified China as having 
“the greatest potential to compete military with the United States” and stated that “shaping 
the choices of major and emerging powers requires a balanced approach, one that seeks 
cooperation but also creates prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative ap-
proaches by themselves may fail to preclude future conflict.”306 According to Dubey, India 
cannot afford to underestimate the challenge posed by China’s emergence as a formidable 
power in convential as well as nuclear capabilities for it continues to increase its nuclear 
arsenal.307 Its armed forces continue to be deployed along India’s northern and eastern 
boarders. In summation, China is a rising major power from the point of view of both con-
vential and nuclear capabilities and India can hardly ignore the implications of the growing 
power gap between the two countries. Moreover, China’s major military build-up in Tibet 
adds significantly to long-term strategic concerns for India. According to Dubey, Beijing’s 
continued support to Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs and its broader policy to bal-
ance India within the subcontinent through increased political cooperation with India’s 
neighbors, requires a balancing approach.308 
  
 
b)  Geography 
 
China and India are separated by the enormous Himalayan mountain chain. They share a 
border along the Himalayas and Nepal and Bhutan, two states lying along the Himalaya 
range that act as physical buffer states. In addition, the disputed Kashmir province 
(claimed by Pakistan and India) borders both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
India. As Pakistan has tense relations with India, Kashmir's state of unrest serves to benefit 
China. Two territories are currently disputed between the People's Republic of China and 
India: Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal Pradesh is located near the far east of 
India, while Aksai Chin is located near the northwest corner of India, at the junction of 
India, Pakistan, and the PRC. China and India have yet to solve their fundamental and very 
large land boundary disputes. India blames China for illegally engaging more than 14,000 
square miles of its territory on its northern border in Kashmir, while China lays claims to 
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more than 34,000 square miles of India's north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.309 The 
two countries have not achieved much in the ongoing border talks that opened in the early 
1980s. In 2003, each side selected “special representatives” – a National Security Advisor 
for India, a Vice foreign minister for China – to improve border discussions. India has tried 
to reassure China that it respects the Chinese position regarding Tibet by recognizing the 
‘Tibetan Autonomous Region’ as part of China, while the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 
2003 recognized the trade route through the Nathu La Pass on the Chinese border to the 
Indian state of Sikkim. Moreover, China stopped listing Sikkim as an independent country 
on its Web site, implicitly recognizing it as a part of India.310 
 
Nevertheless, China's increasing assertiveness over the past two years has led to a near 
freeze in border talks. The 12th round of the special representative talks held in September 
2004 in Beijing ended without any specific agreements.311 China has recently toughened 
its position during border talks by insisting that the Tawang district - a pilgrimage site for 
Tibetans in Arunachal Pradesh - be surrendered to China. India rejected their demand and 
reiterated their position that any areas with established populations would be excluded 
from territorial exchanges. By strengthening their military infrastructure along the border 
and establishing a network of road, rail, and air links in the region, the Chinese attempted 
to pressurise the Indians on the issue.312 India has recently started to reinforce its own 
claims in the border areas that are in dispute with China. New Delhi is increasing its forces 
in the eastern sector along the border of Arunachal Pradesh. It also re-deployed elements of 
its 27th Mountain Division from Jammu and Kashmir to the 30-km-wide Siliguri corridor 
at the intersection of India, Tibet, and Butha linking India with the rest of its north-eastern 
states. The area is strategically of very high importance – losing control of it would sepa-
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rate India from its entire north-east region.313 Thus till the time the border disputes are not 
resolved they can always escalate and lead to a major controversy.314 
 
 
c) Threat Perception 
 
Historical Experience – 1962 War  
 
Events leading to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and the ruthless Indian disillusion-
ment with the Chinese following that conflict has provided a valuable context for analyz-
ing current developments in Chinese-Indian relations. Even after China marched into Tibet 
and annexed it in 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru was convinced that India should look for a close 
relationship with China.315 Nehru was confident that an India-China friendship could form 
the basis of an Asian revival of power where India and China were playing the main role. 
Nehru apparently wanted to give the Chinese the advantage of the doubt since they were, 
like the Indians, also emerging from the colonial era. However, many members of Nehru's 
cabinet regarded China with great suspicion and warned Nehru to examine the event as a 
signal that China could pose a likely danger to India's own territorial integrity. They asked 
Nehru to prepare India’s defence forces against such a possibility. Nehru's trust in China 
cost India greatly in 1962 when the Chinese simultaneously invaded the Eastern and West-
ern sectors of India’s, as well as its shared borders with China. The Indian parliament ac-
cused Nehru of turning a blind eye to Chinese construction of a road through what was 
then Indian Territory in the Aksai Chin. After the invasion and defeat by the Chinese, 
Nehru declared that China had revealed itself as "an expansionist and imperious-minded 
country."316 A feeling of betrayal from a country that they had supported in the interna-
tional arena remained in the Indian psyche for years to come. Consequently, current Indian 
strategic analysts warn Indian officials not to make the same mistakes of the past by de-
emphasizing Chinese border aggressions. They state that if New Delhi publicly downplays 
offensive Chinese activities in the border areas (as it did with construction of the road 
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through the Aksai Chin in the early 1960s), the Chinese will interpret the silence as an in-
dication of weakness and exploit it.317 
 
Aggressive Perceptions of Chinese Foreign Policy 
 
Indian threat perceptions are strongly supported by the writings of Alastair Ian Johnston.318 
Based on his close reading of Chinese history and the classic texts of Chinese strategy, 
Johnston argues that China historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik or 
parabellum319 strategic culture that has persisted across different cultural contexts into the 
Maoists period and beyond. The Confucian paradigm only existed as an idealised strategic 
discourse and had rarely been practised.320 On the contrary, Chinese decision-makers have 
internalised the parabellum strategic culture to such an extent that Chinese strategic behav-
iour exhibits a preference for offensive uses of force, “mediated by a keen sensitivity to 
relative capabilities.“321 This paradigm vies the external environment as “dangerous, ad-
versaries as dispositionally threatening, and conflict as zero-sum, in which the application 
of violence is ultimately required to deal with threats.”322 The more this balance is favour-
able, the more advantageous it is to adopt offensive coercive strategies; the less favourable, 
the more advantageous to adopt defensive or accommodationist strategies, to buy time un-
til the balance shifts again. If one accepts this view, and indeed the empirical evidence that 
Johnston gathered is impressive, the current posture cannot be viewed in benign terms. If 
China was being accommodationist, it is only because the balance did not seem to be in its 
favour. “In comparison with other major powers, China was far more likely to use violence 
in a dispute over military-security questions such as territory.”323 
 
Chinese Cooperation with Pakistan 
 
Some Indian analysts believe that China is pursuing a two-way strategy of engaging India 
into compliance through greater economic interaction while taking steps to encircle India 
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and undermine its security.324 China is strengthening ties to its traditional ally Pakistan and 
slowly gaining influence with other South Asian states. The South Asian nations view 
good ties with China as a useful counterweight to Indian dominance in the region. China 
uses military and other assistance to court these nations, especially when India and other 
Western states try to use their assistance programs to encourage respect for human rights 
and democracy.325 Pakistan and China have long-standing strategic ties. China is Paki-
stan’s largest defence supplier. It transferred equipment and technology to Pakistan’s nu-
clear weapons and ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing 
Pakistan’s strength in the South Asian strategic balance. Stephen Cohen, an expert on the 
Indian and Pakistani militaries, describes China as pursuing a classic balance of power by 
supporting Pakistan.326 Moreover China has helped Pakistan build two nuclear reactors and 
continues to support Pakistan’s nuclear program. 
 
China’s Nuclear Deterrent 
 
China is one of the few countries worldwide that is still increasing its nuclear capabilities. 
Unlike other middle powers like France and Britain which remain linked to North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s code of conduct, China’s nuclear deterrent remains independent 
from any possible internal or external checks and balances.327 There is a strategic shift 
from a passive Chinese foreign policy agenda to a pro-active national security policy that 
has characterized China’s nuclear deterrent the early 1990s. 
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5.2 Realignment with the United States and Containing China 
 
 
This paper has proved that China continues to constitute a serious threat to India’s national 
security. Moreover, the ‘China threat’ has been steadily increasing since the end of the 
Cold War. In order to cope with the threat, structural realist scholars state that India en-
gaged in a close relationship with the United States following the nuclear tests in 1998.  
 
 
5.2.1 Nuclear Tests – Beginning of India’s Realignment Process towards the United 
States 
 
Even though there was confusion and an apparent loss of direction in India’s foreign policy 
following the nuclear tests in May 1998, India was very clear on one point: the country had 
to move closer to the United States. The message was expressed within a few hours of the 
first explosion on May 11: India was ready for understanding, an accommodation, a com-
promise, and even for a strategic partnership with the US328 In a personal letter to President 
Clinton, a few hours after the nuclear tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee strongly emphasized 
that the tests were not directed against the United States but against Pakistan and China. 
Rather than explaining the reasons for the nuclear tests to the people of India, Vajpayee felt 
duty-bound to give an explanation to the US government:  
 
“Mr President, these countries are not just our problems. You also cannot trust 
them. Whatever trade relations you make with China, you know that China’s nu-
clear weapons and missiles are a threat to you also. And there are massive viola-
tions of human rights in that country. Should we not as the largest democracies of 
the world stand together?”329  
 
The letter had listed the main reason for India’s nuclear tests: the deterioration in the nu-
clear environment caused by China and Pakistan. They were labelled, albeit indirectly, as 
enemies of India. According to Koshy, one has to pay particular attention to the mention-
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ing of the phrase: “China is a threat to you also.” India was confident that the United States 
also perceived China as a threat in Asia. This assumption is fundamental for understanding 
India’s balancing strategy against China.330 Analyzing the United States relations to India’s 
biggest threat, China, India concluded that the US had great interest in containing Chinese 
power in Asia and the official statements of US agencies support this assumption.331 Ac-
cording to the ‘Quadrennial Defence Review’ the rise of Asia was the most important ele-
ment in the new emerging balance of power.332 A rising China threatens regional security 
balance in Asia and the United States wants to prevent China from becoming too powerful 
or even claiming the role of a hegemon in Asia. With respect to state actors, the ‘Quadren-
nial Defence Review’ suggests that the primary global security threat to the United States is 
imposed by China.: “Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to 
compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that 
could over time off set traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies”.333 
The Pentagon’s 2005 report to Congress ‘The Military Power of the Peoples Republic of 
China’ on China’s military power acknowledges that its goal of modernizing national de-
fence is proceeding well:  
 
“China does not face a direct threat from another nation. Yet, it is heavily investing 
in its military facilities, particularly in programs designed to improve power projec-
tion.334 The pace and scope of China’s military build-up are, already, such as to put 
regional military balances at risk. Current trends in China’s military modernization 
could provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a range of military opera-
tions in Asia, potentially posing a credible threat to modern militaries operating in 
the region.”335 
 
Based on these reports, according to Koshy it was very clear that India’s realignment to-
wards the United States was based on the common perception of the ‘China threat’.336 This 
was made undoubtedly clear by Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee himself when he declared 
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in a speech in New York at the end of September 1998 – that India and the U.S. were 
‘natural allies’. He was eloquent about the potential for an alliance between the two coun-
tries”. All that was needed was a little sensitivity from the American side for India’s secu-
rity concerns”.337 Even though Vajpayee did not mention China directly, it was very ap-
parent that he referred to the threat posed by China. 
 
In order to balance Chinese power in Asia, in the following period, India and the United 
States particularly increased military-to-military cooperation. In the ‘National Security 
Strategy’ the United States underscored the key role of India in U.S. strategic planning, 
declaring that the “[...] strategic partnership will contribute to the foreign policy and na-
tional security interests of the United States by helping to improve the security of a country 
(India) that has been and continues to be a positive force for political stability in Asia..”338 
The document further states that “the United States has undertaken a transformation in its 
bilateral relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies. We share an interest 
in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia. We start with a view of 
India as growing world power with which we have common interests.”339  
 
A Pentagon Report of 2003 US officials mentioned the ‘China Threat’ for the first time by 
its name when referring to its relations with India.340 The report states that “the US and 
India should forge a long-term security alliance partly aimed at containing China”. The 
report further argues that “strategic environment with India could become a future invest-
ment of growing value if Asia becomes a hostile environment”, adding that the Pentagon 
felt India “should emerge as a vital component of U.S. strategy”.341 Moreover, another 
report by the Pentagon in the same year showed that the United States valued India’s stra-
tegic position. The report, ‘The Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China’, empha-
sized the importance of “India’s strategic location in the centre of Asia, astride the fre-
quently travelled Sea Lanes of Communication linking the Middle East and East Asia 
(China), which makes India “particularly attractive to the US military”.342 
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5.2.2 Making India a Major Power – Increasing Defence Cooperation 
 
Up to this point, this paper has illustrated how structural realists hold the assumption that 
India needed help by an outside power to build its power capabilities in order to effectively 
ensure security against the Chinese threat, since India only had limited resources to do so 
by itself. It needed the support of the United States to build up its own military capabilities. 
In the first part of this chapter this paper has already shown that defence cooperation had 
been considerably intensified between 1998 and 2003. In 2005 the United States went a 
decisive step further in its strategy to cooperate on a military-to-military basis with India. 
In a statement on 25th March 2005 by David C. Mulford, the former US Ambassador to 
India, the United States officially declared to help India become a major global power in 
the 21st century. Mulford said:  
 
“It is official. It is the policy of the United States to help India become a major 
world power in the 21st century. This is what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
conveyed to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during her visit to India – marking 
an exciting turning point to years of hard work to transform the U.S.-India bilateral 
relationship into a true strategic partnership”.343  
 
The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 had already acknowledged India as “a grow-
ing world power with which we have common strategic interests”.344 The United States 
went a step further by enunciating its new grand strategy towards India on March 25, 2005 
when the State Department announced that America had reached a decision to help India 
become a major world-power in the 21st century. Significantly, it further added that “we 
understand fully the implications, including military implications of that statement”.345 
Within a span of five years India was being transformed from a natural ‘natural ally’ to a 
‘Strategic partner’ to a ‘Major world power’. 
 
The first step in helping India to become a major world power was the ‘New Framework 
for the U.S. – India Defence Relationship’ in June 2005. The paper states that the two 
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countries were entering a new era and transforming the relationship “to reflect our com-
mon principle and shared national security interests”.346 According to Mohan the report 
stressed that defence relationship would support and be part of the larger bilateral strategic 
partnership conducting joint exercises and exchanges.347 The major agreement was on ex-
pansion of defence trade. “The United States and India will work to include defence trans-
actions, not solely at end in and of themselves, but as a means to strengthen our security, 
reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve greater interaction between our armed forces 
and build greater understanding between our defence establishment.”348 According to Ko-
shy the New Framework Agreement on Defence Cooperation was by far the most impor-
tant pact signed between India and the United States till date. The agreement not only en-
sured India military assistance for the next ten years but also put strong emphasis on the 
fact that the United States was ready to make deductions in its relationship with Pakistan 
and China if necessary to help strengthen India’s military position.349 
 
 
5.2.3 ‘Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement’ 
 
The second step to helping India become a major power and containing China was to in-
crease India’s power capabilities by supporting its nuclear demands. The ‘Indo-U.S. Civil-
ian Nuclear Agreement’, calling for the separation of India’s nuclear facilities into civilian 
and military, and bringing India’s civilian facilities under international safeguards in ex-
change for nuclear energy cooperation, gave satisfaction to India’s biggest desire.350 Ac-
cording to V. R. Raghavan the nuclear deal has to be seen as another strong signal that 
India and the United States are engaging in a strategy to contain China.351 In her testimony 
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before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on ‘Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agree-
ment’, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted that:  
 
“… this strategic achievement will advance energy security, further environmental 
protection, foster economic and technological development in both of our countries, 
bolster international security, and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. 
All of these benefits, however, must be viewed in a still larger, still greater context: 
What this initiative does to elevate this relationship to a new, strategic height”.352 
 
The fact that the nuclear agreement was mainly aimed against China becomes very appar-
ent when observing China’s reaction to the deal. China expressed strong resentment to-
wards the nuclear-deal. It stated that the agreement constituted "a major blow to the inter-
national non-proliferation regime".353 China's apparent attempt to scuttle the ‘U.S.- India 
Civil Nuclear Agreement’ at the September 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)354 meet-
ing was evidence for many Indians that China does not willingly accept India's rise on the 
world stage.355 The Chinese, encouraged by the unexpected opposition from NSG nations 
like New Zealand, Austria, and Ireland, threatened the agreement with delaying tactics and 
last-minute concerns. The public rebuke of the deal followed several earlier assurances 
from Chinese leaders that Beijing would not block consensus at the NSG.356 However, 
according to Raghavan, China’s opposition to the deal has been long expected even though 
Beijing maintained an ambiguity about its stance. “Whether it is motivated by geopolitical 
considerations or commercial interests, the US-India nuclear agreement has constituted a 
major blow to the international non-proliferation regime,” said the Xiaohui Wu, a re-
searcher from Belfer Center.357 “Irrespective of the fate of the US-India nuclear pact, the 
United States’ multiple standards on non-proliferation issues have met with a sceptical 
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355 Bohnsle, Rahul, Prakash, Ved and Gupta, K. R. (2007): “Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal”, Nice Printing 
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357 The Belfer Center is the hub of the Harvard Kennedy School's research, teaching, and training in interna-
tional security affairs, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy. 
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world,” she added.358 China threatened that if the deal would go through, it would consider 
the possibility of striking a similar deal of its own with Pakistan. In a statement of a Chi-
nese delegation to the NSG, China argued that the group (NSG) should address the aspira-
tions of other countries too, an implicit reference to Pakistan.  
 
China was especially worried that the nuclear deal would foster military cooperation be-
tween India and the United States.359 India has embarked on an ambiguous military mod-
ernization effort and is increasingly looking to the United States to acquire highly devel-
oped military hardware. In line with Curtis the completion of the civil nuclear deal will 
most likely raise the confidence of the Indian defence establishment in the United States as 
a reliable supplier and, therefore, set the stage for a much broader and deeper defence rela-
tionship between the US and India over the next several years.360 In 2005, India and the US 
signed a 10-year defence framework agreement that calls for expanded joint military exer-
cises, increased defence-related trade, and the establishment of a defence and procurement 
production group. Moreover, according to Curtis, the US and India have conducted more 
than 50 military exercises since 2002, demonstrating how far the military partnership has 
progressed in a relatively short period.361 One of the most significant exercises was held in 
September of 2008 in the Bay of Bengal and involved three other nations – Japan, Austra-
lia and Singapore .This exercise, according to Curtis, raised high concerns in Beijing about 
the development of a broader strategy to counter Chinese influence in that area.362 
 
 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that the realignment of India’s foreign policy towards the United 
States that started right after the nuclear tests in 1998 was driven by increased national 
security concerns on the Indian side. With the end of the Cold War and decline of the So-
viet Union, India lost its most important supporter and ally with regard to national security. 
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The diplomatic shield of the Soviet Union against India’s main national security threats, 
Pakistan and China, was no longer in place. At the same time India identified a steadily 
rising China as the most important element in the new emerging balance of power in Asia. 
Hence, it follows that according to the ‘Balance of Threat Theory’ China continues to pose 
a serious threat to India’s national security.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis provides strong evidence that India followed balancing strategies 
to handle the changed security environment and the threat imposed by China. Following 
the logics of ‘Balance of Threat Theory’ India increased its own power capabilities with 
the support of the United States. Strong defence ties and increased military to military co-
operation indicates that the United States wishes India to become more powerful; the rea-
son being that a more powerful India - in the logic of ‘Balance of Threat Theory’ - will 
automatically counterweight Chinese influence in Asia. Secondly, India engaged in a ‘stra-
tegic partnership’ with the United States to contain Chinese power in the Asian region (ex-
ternal balancing). An engagement that started with defence cooperation following the nu-
clear tests in 1998 was solidified with the “Framework Agreement on Defence Coopera-
tion” in 2002 and culminated in the ‘Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement’ in 2005. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
This paper has used two different approaches of international relations theory to describe 
the major shift in India’s foreign policy towards the United States that started following the 
nuclear tests in 1998. One finds that both schools of thought, liberalism and realism, have 
very different ideas and arguments to explain the shift in India’s U.S. policy. 
 
 
6.1 Analyzing India’s Realignment towards the United States: A Liberalist Perspec-
tive 
 
This study has shown that economic ties have not been an important aspect in the realign-
ment of Indian foreign policy towards the United States. While political relations between 
India and the United States started to improve post 1998, economic cooperation in total 
and relative terms was stagnant. In fact the Indian nuclear tests of 1998 resulted in a vari-
ety of sanctions imposed by the United States on India. Economic ties started to improve 
only after 2001. However this paper shows that economic cooperation improved only in 
terms of total trade volume but decreased in relative importance. It has been indicated that 
while India slowly but steadily decreased its economic dependence on the United States, it 
significantly increased economic cooperation with other countries, namely China. There-
fore, this paper has drawn a direct  conclusion: that the economic interdependence theory 
and its  argument that increased economic ties between the US and India had great influ-
ence on the realignment of Indian foreign policy can not explain the shift of India’s foreign 
policy towards the United States that started following the nuclear tests in 1998.   
 
This study has shown that during the Cold War external and internal factors combined to 
prevent regime type and common democratic values from having influence on India’s for-
eign policy. In line with a structural-realist understanding of international relations the po-
litical reality of Cold War, the power politics between the Soviet Union and the United 
States inhibited the impact that democracy could have played in India’s foreign policy vis a 
vis the United States. Furthermore, it has been shown that even after the systemic con-
straints of the Cold War vanished and an international system that favoured democracy 
emerged, common regime type was not able to directly make an impact on India-US rela-
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tions. On the contrary, the United States found reasons to highlight shortcomings of the 
Indian ‘democratic experiment’ instead of emphasizing on the possibilities for cooperation. 
However, liberalists argue that with Atal Bihari Vajpayee coming to power in 1998, com-
mon democratic regime type and shared democratic values started to play a significant role 
in India’s foreign policy agenda. Based on the assumption, that domestic actors with their 
beliefs and ideas have the ability to strongly influence foreign policy  goals, liberalists ar-
gue that it was Vajpayee’s and Singh’s personal enthusiasm with democracy that made 
regime type and common democratic values play a decisive role in Indian foreign policy. 
However this study provides evidence that Vajpayee and Singh used democracy in a   lar-
ger strategy to strengthen the overall relationship between the two countries. Even though 
Vajpayee and Singh would emphasise on democratic regime type and shared democratic 
values with great enthusiasm every time they had the opportunity to do so, this study has 
shown that they were very cautious in making any real political efforts in the direction of 
democracy promotion in relations with the United States. In line with this reasoning India 
took advantage of the democracy issue with the United States to make sure that more im-
portant strategic issues were realized for its foreign policy interests.  
 
 
6.2 Analyzing India’s Realignment towards the United States: A Realist Perspective 
 
According to this study structural realist are more convincing in identifying the key issues 
that forged better relations between India and the US. It has been shown that national secu-
rity concerns have been the most important motivation in the realignment of Indian foreign 
policy towards the United States. This paper indicates that the end of the Cold War had 
two major implications for India’s security environment. At first, with the decline of the 
Soviet Union India had lost its most important supporter and ally with regard to national 
security. And secondly, with the diplomatic shield of the Soviet Union gone, a steadily 
rising China posed a gradually increasing threat to India’s national security. Consequently 
for India, it became necessary to analyze the changed security environment, identify its 
implications, and revise its foreign policy accordingly. While India had the military capa-
bilities to guarantee its security against the threat imposed by Pakistan without the help of 
the Soviet Union, it was unable to ensure the same with regard to China. In order to cope 
with its changed security environment after the end of the Cold War India had to find new 
strategies and therefore new allies. In line with structural realists, India concluded that the 
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best means to ensure its own national security was to become more powerful regionally. 
However, India realized that it could not significantly increase its capabilities without the 
help of a power that was outside the region. Recognizing the fact that the United States 
remained the sole super power in the international system, India decided to engage in a 
close relationship with Washington. It has been shown that the focus of the strategic part-
nership between India and the United States was primarily on defence and military coop-
eration. Moreover immediately after India had conducted its nuclear tests in 1998, it had 
made clear that its nuclear weapons were aimed against the threat posed by China. In 
summation structural realists have shown that India’s realignment route towards the United 
States has to be seen as a strategy to cope with the steadily increasing threat imposed by 
China. India followed ‘Balance of Threat Theory’ strategies to handle the changed post 
Cold War security environment and the steadily growing threat imposed by China. In line 
with ‘Balance of Threat Theory’ India sought to increase its own military capabilities (in-
ternal balancing), and established a formal alliance with the United States (external balanc-
ing) to preserve its own national interest by checking the power of the opposing side (Chi-
na). 
 
 
6.3 Colliding Interests 
 
In summation this paper concludes that joint interests in terms of security have been the 
main driving aspects behind the realignment of India’s US policy that started following the 
nuclear tests in 1998. Economic interests continue to be an obvious interest for both coun-
tries. However in the last decade economic interdependence has decreased and economic 
issues became less of a concern in India’s foreign policy towards the United States. This 
study has shown that the promotion of democratic regime type and democratic values has 
been part of the American foreign policy agenda. On the other hand this paper indicated 
that these ideals are not central in India’s foreign policy. This paper argues that those aims 
always take a back seat to national security issues of India. It comes to the conclusion that 
the most important joint interest for India and the United States is to keep a stable balance 
of power in Asia. By boosting Indian power capabilities India automatically becomes a 
serious counterweight to China in the Asian region. Therefore any increase in India’s ca-
pability to project military power in Asia is viewed favourably in Washington. In this con-
text the author of this paper wants to stress the great importance of the ‘India-U.S. Civilian 
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Nuclear Deal’ that was ratified by India and the US in 2005 and approved by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2008. The author perceives the nuclear deal as a 
strong manifestation of the strategic relationship between India and the United States. 
Moreover, in the author’s judgment, the deal provides strong evidence that the strategic 
relationship is indeed directed against China. The author’s opinion is supported by advoca-
tors and detractors of the deal alike, who have termed the deal ‘historic’ and described it to 
be the most important strategic re-alignment of Indian foreign policy in recent times.363  
 
 
6.4 Critics of the realignment process towards the United States 
 
The author of this paper stresses that this study concentrates solely on explaining the rea-
sons behind the shift of Indian foreign policy towards the United States without making 
any judgement on whether this is the right path to follow for India or not. It has to be clear 
that this paper did not discuss the question whether a realignment towards the United 
States is to the advantage or disadvantage of India? Certainly structural realists would ar-
gue that an orientation towards the United States is desirable for India because it helps the 
country to meet its most important threat to national security: containing the increasing 
threat imposed by China. However there are also critics of Indian foreign policy behaviour 
post the nuclear tests in 1998. They stress the drawbacks that are in their point of view re-
lated with the Indian realignment towards the United States.  
 
There are many scholars in India who do not believe India’s relationship with China is a 
zero-sum game.364 They argue in favour of a more moderate China policy. According to 
them, India should build favourable relationships with both the United States and China.365 
Moreover they argue that Indian balancing strategies are in fact jeopardizing the balance of 
power in the Asian region and in a sense putting India’s national security interests at risk. 
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V. R. Raghavan argues that India has to provide reasonable security assurances to the Chi-
nese government that its partnership with the US is not directed against China.366 India has 
to guarantee that it joins the Asian balance of power without causing unnecessary turbu-
lence.367 In line with Raghavan India’s build-up of its own power capabilities and strength-
ening military and defence ties with the US are likely to send a wrong signal to China. 
Raghavan worries that China will response with increasing its own power capabilities lead-
ing to a dangerous arms race in Asia. An India-US strategic partnership that is based on the 
premise of potential confrontation with Beijing would deliver a serious blow to India’s 
hopes of emerging as a major power centre in Asia and as a force for stability in the region 
as a whole.368  
 
Among leftist critics there is a growing concern that India is becoming a client-state to the 
United States.369 They argue that India’s shift towards the United States restrains the coun-
try’s sovereign decision-making capacity in relation to the United States and on other ma-
jor international political issues.370 In line with Ninan Koshy, India’s vote in the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) against Iran in September 2005 is one good example 
of India making decisions against its own national interest by surrendering under US pres-
sure.371 Immediately after India had voted against Iran, Iran informed India that the five-
million ton a year Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export deal, with deliveries scheduled to 
start in 2009 for a twenty-five-year period was off. Moreover Koshy expressed concerns 
that the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline was at risk. 372 And in fact in 2009 India withdrew 
from the project over pricing and security issues. According to Raghavan the main reason 
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was the great pressure by the US who urged India to withdraw from the deal with Iran be-
cause of Teheran's suspected ambitions to build nuclear weapons.373  
 
 
6.5 Outlook 
 
Understanding the nature of critical views is important when we raise the question if the 
realignment process is likely to continue in the coming future? Some prominent Indian 
thinkers have seriously started to question the benefits of India’s shift in foreign policy 
towards the United States.374 One such critic is Pratap Bhanu Mehta, a leading political 
scientist and the President and Chief Executive of Centre for Policy Research, an influenti-
al New Delhi-based think tank.375 According to Mehta, “the skepticism about the U.S. does 
not come, as critics allege, an old mindset, paranoiac about the U.S.  It comes instead, from 
confidence in our strength, and a sense that we [the Indian people] overestimate U.S. pow-
er”.376 He argues that India has an extremely independent mindset and will follow its own 
course of action. According to Mehta there will be no alliance between India and the U.S., 
where India is the junior partner. A rising India will engage with both China and the U.S. 
on the basis of its own national interests.” A. K. Damodaran also argues that India’s U.S. 
policy will likely be a failure because of India’s colonial heritage and India’s strong em-
phasis on an independent foreign policy, are likely to prevent India from joining any al-
liance-like relationship with the United States where India will be a junior partner to the 
United States.377 Damodaran identifies a fundamental need of sovereignty for India.378 At 
all costs, he argues, India must follow a single point agenda. On matters where its own 
interests are not concretely affected, India should avoid e criticizing the US. But in the 
final analysis, India must be confident in the pursuit of its own interests irrespective of how 
the US reacts. Bilateral relations between democracies are usually strong enough to survive 
moments of discord. 
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However, according to Dheeraj Kumar there are strong signals that the shift in India’s for-
eign policy towards the United States is likely to continue in the near future.379 As China is 
steadily increasing its military and economic capabilities and strengthening its ties with 
countries in South Asia, both the United States and India, have significant interest of con-
taining Chinese power in the region. Therefore, according to Kumar, balancing strategies 
will likely continue to dominant the India-US strategic partnership.380 Another interesting 
question is whether democracy can have more influence in the future of India’s US policy. 
As we have seen this paper concludes that regime type and democratic values have not 
played a significant role in India’s US policy so far. However this paper does not argue 
that they should not or will never do so. On the contrary, the author of this paper believes 
that emphasizing on regime type and common democratic values can make the developing 
relationship even stronger. Based on ideas of liberal theorist this author and other experts 
on Indian foreign policy argue that an increased role of democratic values may make the 
relationship more stable and foreseeable.381 Motha and Sinha present an interesting argu-
ment and argue that regime type and democratic values might be able to play a more sig-
nificant role in the near future.382 In line with Motha and Sinha, Indian society and political 
environment are today more liberal in comparison to the past and therefore liberal values 
could play a more sufficient role. The demographic shift in the character of its population 
has given rise to new political, economic and linguistic elite, thrown up by the democratic 
process. The generation nurtured in a slew of traditional and anti-colonial cocktails that 
brewed in India over the last two centuries is no longer dominant. Today the administration 
in India is run by modern minded decision makers who do not suffer from personal memo-
ries of the pain of partition, are not traumatized by the degrading war with China in 1962, 
and most importantly, are excitingly committed to democratic values. As Motha and Sinha 
argue Indian democracy has expanded slowly, but surely over the last 60 years, to bring the 
entire population of India into the democratic mainstream.383  They argue further that a 
robust press, the power of television and cinema, has catapulted India into arguably the 
world’s foremost information society. Not only the indices relating to health and education 
are rising rapidly, the underlying socio-economic revolution has also created the so called 
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‘great Indian middle class’, which provides the mainstay for movements for democracy, 
human rights and economic growth with distributive justice.384  
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8. Appendix 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to understand the realignment of Indian foreign policy towards the 
United States, a process that started after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests. It analyzes the key 
motives and driving forces that initiated the realignment of India’s U.S. policy. For the 
analysis this thesis has used two different approaches of explaining the changes in Indian 
foreign policy. This study has shown that the theories of liberalism and realism have differ-
ing explanations and arguments to explain the shift in India’s US policy.  
 
Democratic Peace theorists argue that common democratic models and shared democratic 
values have been the main driving forces behind the recent shift. Economic Interdepend-
ence theorists hold that increased economic cooperation had a decisive effect on the overall 
relationship between India and the United States and therefore contributed to the realign-
ment process. However this paper has evidence to suggest that shared democratic values 
and economic cooperation can not give satisfying explanations on why India started to 
reorient its foreign policy in direction United States after it conducted three nuclear devices 
in 1998. 
 
This paper concludes that structural realist provide convincing arguments to show that na-
tional security issues were the main driving factor in this realignment process. It has been 
shown that a rising China constitutes the biggest major threat to India’s national security, 
which forms the basis for Indo-US cooperation in the recent years. Structural realists rec-
ognized that India needed the help of an extra regional power like the United States to cope 
with the pressures of China’s rise. This school of thought explains India’s engagement with 
the United States was based on ‘Balance of Threat’ strategies to deal with the security 
challenge it perceives with the rise of China. The ‘Balance of Threat Theory’ model illus-
trates that India sought to increase its own military capabilities (internal balancing), and 
established a formal alliance with the United States (external balancing) to preserve its 
own national interest by checking an increasingly powerful China in the Asian region. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Arbeit dient dem Verständnis der Neuausrichtung der Indischen Außenpolitik 
gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten, die nach den Atomtests im Jahr 1998 begann. Sie 
analysiert die Schlüsselmotive und Beweggründe, die zum positiven Wandel der Indischen 
US Politik führten. Als Grundlage bedient sich diese Arbeit zweier verschiedener Theorien 
der Außenpolitik, dem Liberalismus und dem Realismus. Die vorliegende Abhandlung 
zeigt, dass die beiden Ansätze verschiedene Argumente und Erklärungen geben um den 
Richtungswechsel in Indiens US Politik zu begründen. In diesem Zusammenhang 
argumentieren die Anhänger der Theorie des Demokratischen Friedens dass die 
gemeinsamen demokratischen Modelle und die daraus resultierenden kollektiven Werte die 
Hauptbeweggründe für den erfolgten außenpolitischen Wechsel nach 1998 gewesen sind. 
Der ökonomische Interdependenzansatz behauptet wiederum, dass die erhöhte 
wirtschaftliche Kooperation entscheidenden Einfluss auf die politischen Beziehungen 
zwischen Indien und der USA hatte und so ausschlaggebend zur Neuausrichtung beitrug. 
Diese Arbeit verdeutlicht jedoch, dass die gemeinsamen demokratischen Werte und die 
ökonomische Zusammenarbeit nicht die außenpolitischen Veränderungen der Indischen 
US Politik nach 1998 erklären können. 
 
Diese Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass strukturelle Realisten die überzeugendsten 
Argumente liefern um den kürzlich erfolgten Richtungswechsel in der indischen 
Außenpolitik zu erklären. Strukturelle Realisten sind der Auffassung, dass die nationale 
Sicherheit Indiens der bestimmende Grund der Neuausrichtung gewesen sei. Diese Arbeit 
hat gezeigt, dass der in den 1990er Jahren begonnene Aufstieg Chinas die größte 
Bedrohung für Indiens nationale Sicherheit darstellt. Strukturellen Realisten haben 
festgestellt, dass Indien auf die Hilfe einer außerregionalen  Macht angewiesen war um mit 
dem Aufstieg Chinas mithalten zu können. In diesem Sinne hat Indien besonders seine 
Beziehungen gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten verbessern können. Im Sinne der 
„Balance of Threat Theory“ hat Indien mit Unterstützung der USA seine Militärische 
Macht vergrößert um so gemeinsam mit den Vereinigten Staaten den immer größer 
werdenden Einfluss chinesischer Macht in der asiatischen Region einzudämmen.  
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